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I.  INTRODUCTION 
When you are sick, you call your doctor.  As the patient, you believe that your 
doctor will examine you and make a decision on the best course of treatment for you.  
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You trust that your medical interests are at the forefront of their mind.  Simply 
stated, this is the age old patient-doctor relationship. 
However, modern health care systems have blurred this otherwise straight-
forward relationship.4  More money is spent on health care per person in the United 
States than anywhere else in the world, and each year the costs grow higher.5  
Americans spend greater than $1 trillion annually on medical care forcing the use of 
cost containment programs in order to curb these costs.6  Thus came the birth of the 
Health Management Organization (HMO). HMOs use financial incentives to prompt 
physicians to recognize the cost consequences of their treatment decisions and thus 
reduce the amount of care subject to insurance reimbursement.7  Financial incentives 
place physicians in a tempting situation by encouraging them to order less treatment 
and reap greater financial reward.8  Financial incentive programs have taken the 
place of the “serpent of temptation” in a modern day medical Garden of Eden.9 
The cutting of costs comes with a price to the patient.  Sixty-one percent of 
managed care patients surveyed stated they were very or somewhat worried that if 
they became sick, their insurer would be more concerned about saving money than 
about their medical care.10  In addition, many of the methods of cost-containment 
                                                                
4RAND ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 545 (1997) 
(arguing that “[w]hat makes managed care such an important development is its effects on the 
longstanding series of relationships within the health care system and its redistribution of 
power among the health care players.”). 
5HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., MANAGED CARE: INTEGRATING THE DELIVERY AND FINANCING 
OF HEALTH CARE, PART B 1 (1996). 
6See Daniel P. Sulmasy, et al., Physicians’ Ethical Beliefs About Cost-Control 
Arrangements, ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED., Mar. 13, 2000, at 649. 
7Tracy E. Miller & William M. Sage, Disclosing Physician Financial Incentives, JAMA, 
Apr. 21, 1999, at 1424. 
8David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less: Financial Incentives to Limit 
Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155, 160 (1996) (“[p]hysicians recognize that they can increase 
their compensation by reducing their use of ancillary services.”). 
9See Genesis 3:1-19 (reciting the biblical story of Adam and Eve and the serpent of 
temptation:  “[t]he snake tricked me into eating it.”). 
10See Miller, supra note 7, at 8 (discussing a Kaiser-Harvard study and explaining that 
“[s]tructured information about incentives might correct public misperceptions arising from 
negative media coverage, perhaps by presenting the issue in the context of other plan 
attributes, such as quality improvement initiatives.”). 
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commonly used are found to be ethically objectionable by physicians themselves.11  
The Proverb stands true, “He who pays the piper calls the tune.”12 
This Note will begin by examining the emergence of managed care starting with 
the “fee-for-service” system and moving to the modern HMO.  Section IIIA. of this 
article explore several types of HMOs, compared with the different types of 
physician reimbursement mechanisms utilized by HMOs.  Physician reimbursement 
programs often contain direct financial incentives.  The main types of financial 
incentives utilized by HMOs will be discussed.  These incentive programs place the 
physician in a dilemma when attempting to determine a patient’s best course of 
treatment.  In addition, Section IIIB. of the background addresses the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), focusing on the state action preemption 
clause and the roadblock that ERISA creates for patients who want to bring claims 
against their HMO. 
The impact of physician incentive programs is at the heart of the recent Supreme 
Court case Herdrich v. Pegram. In Herdrich, the patient, Cynthia Herdrich, 
challenged the use of a common incentive structure that allowed physicians to profit 
from decreased utilization of expensive medical procedures.13  Ms. Herdrich alleged 
that the use of these incentive programs created a conflict of interest for her treating 
physician and that conflict of interest caused a misdiagnosis of her appendicitis.14  
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Ms. Herdrich but was later 
overruled by the Supreme Court.15 
This article suggests that Herdrich v. Pegram was wrongly decided.  It will be 
shown that the case should have been remanded to the District Court for further 
review. In Section IVA., this article suggests that a fiduciary duty exists between the 
HMO and it’s membership. Even under an ERISA standard a fiduciary duty could be 
perceived. 
In Section IVB., this article establishes that physician financial incentive 
agreements implemented by an HMO can rise to the level of a breach of fiduciary 
                                                                
11See Sulmasy, supra note 6, at 649 (concluding that “[m]any of the methods now 
commonly used to influence medical decision making are considered ethically objectionable 
by most midcareer physicians”). In 1991, the authors conducted a survey designed to elicit 
opinions regarding the medical practice environment and to assess the career satisfaction of 
physicians who had recently entered the practice.  Id. at 650. The survey consisted of 102 
closed-ended questions that were presented to physicians via telephone interviews.  Id. 
Telephone interviews were completed for 1549 physicians creating a response rate of 74 
percent.  Id. at 651. 
12David D. Griner, Paying the Piper: Third-Party Payor Liability for Medical Treatment 
Decisions, 25 GA. L. REV. 861 (1991) (Proverb). 
13See Sarah A. Klein, Supreme Court to Weigh Physician Financial Incentives, AM. MED. 
NEWS, Oct. 18, 1999, at 1 (discussing Herdrich at the appellate level and introducing the 
question “[d]o common financial incentives such as withhold pools create a conflict of interest 
for physicians and a cause of action for injured patients?”). The article further comments on 
the appellate decision, stating “[o]ne of the concerns . . . about the appellate decision is that it 
really takes what is pretty much a garden variety medical malpractice case and turns it into a 
federal case under ERISA.”  Id. at 2. 
14Id. at 1. 
15See Pegram at 213 (per curiam). 
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duty.  The article will show that the bonus distribution utilized by the HMO in 
Herdrich could cause a breach by improperly influencing the physician decision-
making process. 
This Note will attempt to persuade the reader that the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Herdrich v. Pegram was a missed opportunity.  “[I]nstead of establishing 
a clear rule about the legality of financial incentives paid to physicians, the justices 
found a host of problems with the case itself. . . .”16  The unanimous Supreme Court 
decision handed down June 12, 2000, established that neither physicians nor HMOs 
can be sued under federal benefits law for using cost containment and physician 
financial incentives to limit care.17  Herdrich was an opportunity for the Court to 
fully explore the effect that incentive programs used by HMOs have on the patient 
treatment decisions made by physicians.  
In Section IVC., this Note concludes by suggesting that there are three solutions 
that would assist in preventing a situation like the one in Herdrich from happening 
again: (1) cases like Herdrich v. Pegram must be remanded for continued fact-
finding regarding the details of the financial motives involved, (2) ERISA must be 
amended in order to acknowledge a fiduciary relationship between HMO members 
and the HMO itself, and (3) physician financial arrangements must be disclosed to 
HMO patient members. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  The Facts 
On March 1, 1991, Cynthia Herdrich, was experiencing pain in the middle area 
of her groin.18  Ms. Herdrich was examined by Carle Clinic Association (Carle) 
physician, Dr. Lori Pegram.19  Six days later on March 7, upon examination of Ms. 
Herdrich, Dr. Pegram discovered a six by eight centimeter inflamed mass in 
Herdrich’s abdomen.20  Cynthia Herdrich was suffering from appendicitis.21  Dr. 
                                                                
16Sarah A. Klein, High Court Hears Doctor Incentive Case, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 13, 
2000, at 1. The article explains that at one point Justice Anthony Kennedy asked an attorney 
for Dr. Pegram and the Plan “if there weren’t times when the physician, as an owner of an 
HMO, was serving the function of plan fiduciary and a health care professional.”  Id.  Justice 
Kennedy then directly asked the attorney “[i]s there some gray area where the doctor is 
wearing two hats?”  Id.  The attorney replied that there may be some gray area but not in the 
case before them.  Id. 
17See Sarah A Klein, Justices Validate HMO Pay Incentives, AM. MED. NEWS, June 26, 
2000, at 1(referring to the ERISA statute).  When a state law cause of action is preempted by 
ERISA, the claim cannot be pursued and must be dismissed and the plaintiff’s only remedy is 
found in the remedy provisions of the ERISA statute. See discussion infra Part III.B.1 
(discussing the effect of ERISA on managed care). 
18Herdrich at 365. 
19See Id. On examination, Dr. Pegram acknowledged that Ms. Herdrich was experiencing 
pain in the midline area of her groin.  See Id. 
20See Id. 
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Pegram determined that an ultrasound should be performed in order to take a closer 
look at the mass.22  An ultrasound procedure would be needed in order to determine 
the nature, size, and exact location of the mass.23  Ideally, Herdrich should have had 
the ultrasound administered promptly after the inflamed mass was discovered so her 
condition could be diagnosed and treated before becoming more serious.24  However, 
Ms. Herdrich’s insurance provider, Carle, required that plan patients receive medical 
care from Carle facilities in what they classify as non-emergent situations.25  
Despite the noticeable inflammation of Ms. Herdrich’s abdomen during the 
examination, Dr. Pegram did not order the ultrasound procedure to be promptly 
conducted at a local hospital in Bloomington, Illinois.26  Dr. Pegram decided Ms. 
Herdrich would have the ultrasound procedure performed at a hospital more than 
fifty miles away in Urbana, Illinois.27  In addition, Ms. Herdrich would need to wait 
eight days until the procedure could be performed at the second hospital.28  While 
waiting to have the ultrasound procedure at the Carle facility, Herdrich’s appendix 
ruptured, causing peritonitis, a life-threatening illness.29  
Cynthia Herdrich had medical coverage through Carle.30 Carle functions as a 
Health Maintenance Organization.31  Carle operates as a pre-paid health insurance 
                                                          
21Herdrich at 683. Appendicitis is defined as an inflammation of the appendix usually 
caused by an infection in the appendix.  See MEDICINENET.COM MEDICAL DICTIONARY, at 
http://www.medicinenet.com (defining “appendicitis”). Appendicitis often causes fever, loss 
of appetite, and right lower quadrant abdominal pain.  Id. 
22Pegram at 215. 
23Herdrich at 374. Ultrasound imaging (ultrasonography) allows physicians to get an 
inside view of soft tissues and body cavities without the use of invasive techniques. See, 
MEDICINENET.COM MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 21 (defining “ultrasound”). 
24Herdrich at 374.  “Doctor Hyman Lans, Herdrich’s medical expert, stated at his 
deposition that Herdrich’s condition worsened during the eight-day waiting period ‘[b]ecause 
obviously there has been another week of that appendix becoming necrotic and sitting in the 
pus, and obviously the process has continued during that week and doesn’t correct itself.’” Id. 
at 375. 
25Id. at 374.  See also discussion infra Part III.A.3.b. (discussing how HMOs control costs 
through the use of panel selection in which the HMO in many cases requires its members to 
use only certain physicians or facilities). 
26See Herdrich at 365. 
27Id.  
28See Pegram at 215. 
29See Herdrich at 374.  Peritonitis is defined as an inflammation of the tissue layer of cells 
lining the inner wall of the abdomen and pelvis that can result from infection, injury and 
bleeding, or diseases.  See MEDICINENET.COM MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 21 (defining 
peritonitis).  In addition, the Appellate Court points out that despite Carle’s attempt to save 
health care costs “[H]erdrich suffered a life-threatening illness (peritonitis), which necessitated 
a longer hospital stay and more serious surgery at a greater cost to her and the Plan.”  And See 
Herdrich at 374. 
30See Pegram at 215.  Petitioners Carle Clinic association, P.C., Health Alliance Medical 
Plans, Inc., and Carle Health Insurance Management Co., Inc. [collectively referred to as 
Carle] function as an HMO.  See id. at 214. 
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plan which provides both medical and hospital services to its members.32  Prepaid 
medical services are provided to patients whose employers contract with Carle to 
provide medical coverage.33  Ms. Herdrich was covered under Carle through her 
husband’s employer, State Farm Insurance.34  State Farm Insurance provided Carle’s 
health insurance plan as a fringe benefit.35 
Carle’s owners are physicians.36 Dr. Pegram was a Carle physician.37  Like other 
HMO systems, Carle collects its payment in advance of the medical care actually 
being provided.38  Thus, the less medical care that is provided by Carle, the more 
profit that Carle’s physicians, who are the HMO’s owners, have left at the end of the 
period.39 
Like any business, Carle looks to hold down its costs.40  Carle accomplishes this 
through devices called “managed care.”41  Carle members must receive their medical 
care from Carle’s own physicians, if at all possible.42  Ms. Herdrich contended that 
this rule was the cause of the eight-day delay for her ultrasound examination, which 
resulted in her ruptured appendix.43 
                                                          
31See id.  See also discussion infra Part III.A.1 (discussing the historical background and 
function of HMOs). 
32Herdrich at 365. 
33Pegram at 215. 
34Id. 
35Herdrich at 365.  Mr. Herdrich’s health insurance was through his employer, State Farm.  
Id.  ERISA is applicable to most employer-sponsored health plans and does not apply to self-
employed persons or to persons whose health care insurance is not provided by their 
employer. See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing ERISA). “[B]ecause her husband’s 
employer . . . provided Carle’s plan as a fringe benefit . . . (making it a “welfare benefit plan” 
under ERISA).”  And See Herdrich at 683. 
36Pegram at 215 (explaining that Carle’s “[o]wners are physicians providing prepaid 
medical services to participants whose employers contract with Carle to provide such 
coverage.”). 
37See id. 
38See Herdrich, 170 F.3d at 683.  See, discussion infra Part III.A.1 (defining HMO 
systems). 
39Id.  See also discussion infra Part III.A.3 (describing HMO cost containment 
techniques). 
40Pegram at 219 (explaining that “[a]t the least, HMOs, like traditional insurers, will in 
some fashion make coverage determinations, scrutinizing requested services against the 
contractual provisions to make sure that a request for care falls within the scope of covered 
circumstances, or that a given treatment falls within the scope of the care promised”). 
41Herdrich at 683.  
42See id.  See also discussion infra Part A.III.3.b (discussing the cost containment 
technique of panel selection). 
43Herdrich at 684. 
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B.  United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois 
Herdrich filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of McLean County, Illinois, on 
October 21, 1992, against Dr. Lori Pegram and Carle.44  The first two counts of the 
complaint were based upon a theory of professional medical negligence, alleging that 
Ms. Herdrich suffered a ruptured appendix and, in turn, contracted peritonitis due to 
Dr. Pegram’s negligence in failing to provide her with timely and adequate medical 
care.45  Herdrich was granted leave to amend her complaint, which she amended to 
include two counts of state law fraud.46  Carle and Pegram responded by stating that 
ERISA preempted the new counts and removed the case to federal court.47  ERISA 
subjects employee benefit plans to federal regulation.48  ERISA preempts “any and 
all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit 
plan” covered by ERISA.49  
The District Court granted Carle’s and Pegram’s motions for summary judgment 
as to the second fraud count.50  Summary judgment on this count was granted 
because Ms. Herdrich relied on an ERISA provision as a basis of monetary relief, as 
opposed to a basis for equitable relief, and the provision does not provide for extra-
contractual damages.51 
However, the District Court did grant Herdrich leave to amend her complaint on 
the remaining fraud count.52  The trial judge concluded ERISA preempted the fraud 
count because Herdrich’s claim was for fraud under state law that involved an 
employee benefit plan.53  The district court granted Herdrich the opportunity to 
submit an amended complaint which clearly sets forth her basis for proceeding under 
ERISA, including the applicable civil enforcement provision.54  Herdrich sought 
relief under 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a), which provides that: 
                                                                
44Herdrich at 365. 
45Id. at 365-66. 
46Id. at 366.  
47Pegram at 215.  When a state law cause of action is preempted by ERISA, the claim 
cannot be pursued and must be dismissed and the plaintiff’s only remedy is found in the 
remedy provisions of the ERISA statute.  And see discussion infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the 
effect of ERISA on managed care). 
48Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983) (“[t]he federal Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 . . . subjects to federal regulation plans providing 
employees with fringe benefits”). In addition, Shaw stated that, “ERISA is a comprehensive 
statute designed to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee 
benefit plans.”  Id.  
49Id. at 91. 
50Pegram at 216. 
51Herdrich at 366. 
52Pegram at 216.  In Herdrich’s amended complaint, “[s]he averred that the defendant’s 
breached their fiduciary duty to plan beneficiaries by depriving them of proper medical care 
and retaining the savings resulting therefrom for themselves.”  Herdrich at 366. 
53Id. 
54See id. 
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Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of 
the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this 
subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses 
to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan 
any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through the use of 
assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other 
equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including 
removal of such fiduciary.55 
Herdrich amended her complaint by alleging that Carle rewarded its physician 
owners for limiting medical care and that incentive entailed an “inherent or 
anticipatory” breach of a fiduciary duty.56  Herdrich concentrated on a “year end 
distribution” to the owners by arguing these “rewards” created an incentive to make 
decisions in the physician’s self-interest, rather than in the exclusive interest of the 
patient.57  The defendants, Carle and Pegram, then moved to dismiss Herdrich’s 
amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.58  
By agreement, the case was assigned to a magistrate judge.59  The magistrate 
judge recommended the amended state fraud count be dismissed because in his 
opinion, “the plaintiff Herdrich failed to identify how any of the defendants is 
involved as a fiduciary to the Plan.”60  However, the magistrate did recommend the 
court give Herdrich one last opportunity to re-plead her claim under ERISA.61  
Herdrich chose not to replead her claim and stood on the count as amended.62  The 
District Court granted Carle’s motion to dismiss the claim, stating that Carle was not 
involved in these events as a fiduciary.63 
The remaining malpractice claims were tried to a jury.64  Herdrich prevailed on 
both malpractice claims and received $35,000 in compensation for her injury.65  
                                                                
55Pegram at 217. 
56Id.  
57Id. at 220. 
58Herdrich at 367. 
59Id. 
60Id. 
61Id. 
62Id.  In response to the magistrate’s decision to allow her to replead her claim, Herdrich 
filled a Rule 72 objection to the recommendation.  See Herdrich, at 367.  Less than two weeks 
later, the District Court denied that objection and adopted the magistrate’s recommendation.  
Id.  The court gave Herdrich twenty-one days from the entry of the order to re-plead her claim, 
which Herdrich chose not to do.  See id. 
63Pegram at 217. The District Court accepted the Magistrate Judge’s determination that 
Carle was not involved in these events as an ERISA fiduciary.  Id. 
64Herdrich at 367. 
65Id. (stating that, “[t]he remaining counts, I and II, went to trial in early December 1996, 
and the jury returned a verdict in Herdrich’s favor on both counts, awarding her $35,000 in 
compensatory damages.”). 
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C.  Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
Ms. Herdrich appealed the dismissal of the ERISA claim alleging a breach of 
fiduciary duty.66  Herdrich alleged that she did state a cause of action for breach of a 
fiduciary duty under ERISA.67  The Seventh Circuit found Carle was acting as a 
fiduciary when its physicians made decisions regarding Herdrich’s care and that 
these allegations were sufficient to state a claim.68  In order to properly state a claim 
for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, the plaintiffs complaint must allege facts 
which set forth three factors: (1) that the defendants are plan fiduciaries; (2) that the 
defendants breached their fiduciary duties; and (3) that a cognizable loss resulted.69  
The appellate court was of the opinion that Herdrich’s pleadings had sufficiently 
alleged each of the elements.70 
1. The Majority Opinion 
The majority relied heavily on the fact that Congress, when it enacted ERISA, 
intended the statutory definition of “fiduciary” to be broadly interpreted.71  In 
addition, a fiduciary breaches its duty of care under ERISA whenever it acts to 
                                                                
66Id. 
67Id. 
68Id. at 373 (holding that “[i]ncentives can rise to the level of a breach where, as pleaded 
here, the fiduciary trust between plan participants and plan fiduciaries no longer exists (i.e., 
where physicians delay providing necessary treatment to, or withhold administering proper 
care to, plan beneficiaries for the sole purpose of increasing their bonuses)”). However, the 
Appellate Court also stated that “[o]ur decision does not stand for the proposition that the 
existence of incentives automatically gives rise to a breach of fiduciary duty.”  See Herdrich at 
367. 
69Id. at 369.  ERISA defines the term “fiduciary” as:   
[e]xcept as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), a person is a fiduciary with 
respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or 
discretionary control respecting management of such a plan or exercises any authority 
or control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders 
investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to 
any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do 
so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the 
administration of such plan.  
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1999). 
70Herdrich at 369. 
71Id. at 370.   
A fiduciary need not be a person with direct access to the assets of the plan . . .  
[c]onduct alone may in an appropriate circumstance impose fiduciary obligations. It is 
the clear intention of the Committee that any person with a specific duty imposed on 
him by this statute be deemed to be a fiduciary . . . . 
Id. (quoting Chairman of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 120 CONG. REC. 
3977, 3983 (Feb. 25, 1974) reprinted in, 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYMENT 
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 3293.)  The Appellate Court also stated 
“[c]onsistent with the expressed intent of Congress, this court has routinely construed the 
ERISA term, ‘fiduciary,’ broadly.”  Id.  
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benefit its own interests.72  It was found that incentives can rise to the level of a 
breach where the fiduciary trust between plan participants and plan fiduciaries no 
longer exists.73  Fiduciary trust is broken where physicians delay in providing 
necessary treatment to, or withhold administering proper care to, plan beneficiaries 
for the sole purpose of increasing their bonuses.74  It was concluded that Herdrich 
had successfully argued there was a flaw in the structure of the incentive program 
established by Carle.75 This flaw comes from the authority of the physician owners 
of Carle to simultaneously control the care of their patients and reap the profits 
generated by the HMO through the use of limited tests and referrals.76  “Under the 
terms of ERISA, Herdrich most certainty has raised the specter that the self-dealing 
physician/owners in this appeal were not acting ‘solely in the interest of the 
participants’ of the Plan.”77  
In summary, the majority held the complaint was sufficient in alleging that 
Carle’s incentive system depleted plan resources as to benefit physicians, possibly to 
the detriment of their patients.78  The court held the ultimate determination of 
whether fiduciary obligations were breached must be decided by the trial court and 
thus remanded the case for further review.79 
2.  The Dissenting Opinion 
The dissent relied on what has been termed the “market forces” argument.80  The 
“market forces” argument assumes that companies sponsoring ERISA plans are 
                                                                
72Id. at 371 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b):  “ERISA expressly prohibits fiduciaries from 
‘deal[ing] with the assets of the plan in his own interest or for his own account,’ or 
‘receiv[ing] any consideration for his own personal account from any party dealing with such 
plan in connection with a transaction involving assets of the plan’”). 
73Herdrich at 373. 
74Id. 
75Id. 
76Id.  Herdrich’s complaint set forth the intricacies of the defendant’s incentive structure 
which included:  
The Plan dictated the very same HMO administrators vested with the authority to 
determine whether health care claims would be paid, and the type, nature, and duration 
of care to be given, were those physicians who became eligible to receive year-end 
bonuses as a result of cost-savings. Because the physician/administrators’ year-end 
bonuses were based on the difference between total plan costs (i.e., the costs of 
providing medical services) and revenues (i.e., payments by plan beneficiaries), an 
incentive existed for them to limit treatment and, in turn, HMO costs so as to ensure 
larger bonuses.  Id. 
77Herdrich at 373. 
78Id. at 380 (concluding that “[o]n the surface, it does not appear to us that it was in the 
interest of plan participants for the defendants to deplete the Plan’s funds by way of year-end 
bonus payouts”).  
79Id. (“based on the record we have before us, we hold that the plaintiff has alleged 
sufficiently a breach of the defendants’ fiduciary duty”). 
80Id. at 381 (Cir. J. Flaum, dissenting).  See also id. at 380. 
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customers who have chosen which group insurance polices they will use.81  These 
employers would like to see their employees claims granted because they want their 
employees to ultimately be satisfied with the fringe benefits offered by the 
employer.82  These employers have the bargaining power to take their business 
elsewhere if employee satisfaction with the plan is poor.83  In the long run, the 
insurer plan would be harmed if employers left and damaged the plan’s chances of 
acquiring new customers based on their reputation of denying claims.84  Thus, 
market forces help to reduce the risk that the fiduciary’s potential conflict of interest 
“will work to the detriment of the plan and the plan beneficiaries.”85 
In addition, the dissent argued that since many plan sponsors and beneficiaries 
view financial incentives as a desirable way of conserving the plan’s assets by 
encouraging physicians to use resources more efficiently, merely alleging the 
existence of incentives to limit care is not enough to create a claim of breach of 
fiduciary duty.86  Because the complaint only asserted that the incentives used by 
Carle were too high, Ms. Herdrich was, inviting the court to make a “determination 
about the appropriate incentive levels in managed care.”87  No such standards for this 
type of review exist and review of this nature would preempt legislative and 
regulatory efforts in this area.88 
The dissent did voice support of the full disclosure of financial incentives and 
noted that it would find a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA if incentives were 
not disclosed.89  However, there was no allegation of nondisclosure in the Herdrich 
complaint.90  “The complaint . . . fails to make any allegations suggesting that the 
                                                                
81Herdrich at 381. 
82Id. at 382. 
83Id. at 381-82. 
84Id.  See also Chalmers v. Quaker Oats Co., 61 F.3d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(explaining that “[i]t is . . . a poor business decision to make it a practice of resisting claims for 
benefits. In the long run, such a practice would dampen loyalties of current employees while 
hindering attempts to attract new talent”) (citation omitted).  See also Mers v. Marriot Int’l 
Group Accidental Death & Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(stating that “[i]t is a poor business decisions to resist paying meritorious claims for benefits”). 
85Herdrich at 381. 
86Id. at 383 (“[T]he goal of a managed care plan is to deliver health care more cost-
effectively by eliminating unnecessary or ineffective treatments more efficiently.  Some plans, 
like the one addressed in this case, attempt to achieve these goals by introducing incentives 
that encourage physicians to internalize part of the costs of treatment”).  In addition, the 
dissent argued that “the desirability of these cost-containment measures from a policy 
standpoint is not our concern.”  Id. at 382 n.1. 
87Id. at 383. 
88Id. (stating that “[t]he Majority’s decision provides little guidance for the district court 
on remand, and I fear that the decision today could lead, both in this case and in the future, to 
untethered judicial assessments of permissible incentive levels in health care plans.”). 
89Herdrich at 384 (“[i]n order for the market to function in this [market] context . . . 
sponsors and beneficiaries need information about the financial incentives that are in place”). 
90Id.  
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financial incentives to limit care are anything but the result of the bargain fairly 
struck between the plan’s sponsor, administrator, and beneficiaries.”91  Carle 
appealed the Seventh Circuit decision and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.92 
D.  United States Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court opinion reviews the background, both factually and legally, 
regarding HMO organizations, medical benefit plans, fiduciary obligations, and the 
meaning of Ms. Herdrich’s allegations.93  
In an HMO system, “the physician’s financial interests lies in providing less care, 
not more.”94  However, the Court argued the check on this influence lies in the 
professional obligation that the physician must provide covered medical services 
with a “reasonable degree of skill and judgment” in the patient’s best interests.95  The 
inducement to ration care goes to the very heart of any HMO scheme.96  The Court 
conceded that rationing care naturally raises some risks while reducing others, but 
argued a legal principal attempting to draw a line between good and bad HMOs 
would in effect be a judgment about socially acceptable medical risk.97  The Court 
concluded this decision would need to be made based on data that the courts do not 
have access to and therefore should be left to the legislative process.98 
In the Herdrich situation, the Court argued there are two sorts of administrative 
acts at play: eligibility decisions and treatment decisions.99  Both parties conceded 
these decisions are often impossible to separate from each other.100  Dr. Pegram’s 
                                                                
91Id. 
92Pegram at 218. 
93Id.  “Whether Carle is a fiduciary when it acts through its physician owners as pleaded in 
the ERISA count depends on some background of fact and law about HMO organizations, 
medical benefit plans, fiduciary obligation, and the meaning of Herdrich’s allegations.” 
94Id. at 218. 
95Id.  
96Id. at 221 (arguing that “no HMO organization could survive without some incentive 
connecting physician reward with treatment rationing”).  The Court also stated that “[t]he 
essence of an HMO is that salaries and profits are limited by the HMO’s fixed membership 
fees.”  Pegram at 221  See also Orentlicher, supra note 8, at 174 (arguing that when a fixed 
budget is given to a physician, the “physicians will recognize that, every time they order a test 
or provide a treatment, there will be fewer resources available for other patients who might 
have a greater need for the resources”). 
97Pegram at 221. 
98Id. (indicating that “such complicated fact-finding and such a debatable social judgment 
are not wisely required of courts unless for some reason resort cannot be had to the legislative 
process, with its preferable forum for comprehensive investigations and judgments of social 
value, such as optimum treatment levels and health care expenditure”). 
99Id. at 228.  The court explains that “eligibility decisions turn on the plan’s coverage of a 
particular condition or medical procedure for its treatment.”  Id.  On the other hand, “treatment 
decisions are choices about how to go about diagnosing and treating a patient’s condition (i.e., 
given a patient’s constellation of symptoms, what is the appropriate medical response?”).  Id. 
100Pegram at 228. 
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decision regarding Ms. Herdrich’s care was a mixed decision of this sort.101  Dr. 
Pegram decided Ms. Herdrich’s condition did not warrant immediate action and the 
consequence of that determination was that Carle would not cover the immediate 
care, whereas it would have done so if Dr. Pegram had made the proper diagnosis 
and the decision to treat Herdrich immediately.102  The Supreme Court reasoned that 
Congress did not intend Carle to be treated as a fiduciary to the extent that it makes 
mixed eligibility decisions acting through its physicians.103  The Court held mixed 
eligibility decisions by an HMO only have a limited resemblance to the usual 
business of traditional trustees in the classic fiduciary relationship.104 
The Court also reviewed how the fiduciary standard, if applied, would affect 
HMOs.105  Recovery on this type of claim would be warranted “simply upon a 
showing that the profit incentive to ration care would generally affect mixed 
[eligibility] decisions” and convert the HMO into a guarantor of recovery, opening 
the floodgates to claims of this kind.106  The Court stated:  
If Congress wishes to restrict its approval of HMO practice to certain 
preferred forms, it may choose to do so . . . [b]ut the Federal Judiciary 
would be acting contrary to the congressional policy of allowing HMO 
organizations if it were to entertain an ERISA fiduciary claim portending 
wholesale attacks on existing HMOs solely because of their structure, 
untethered to claims of concrete harm.107 
The Court believed every claim of fiduciary breach by an HMO physician 
making mixed decisions would boil down to another malpractice claim.108  The only 
advantage the Court found in allowing malpractice actions, as ERISA federal 
fiduciary breach claims against HMOs, was that patients would be eligible for 
reimbursement of attorney’s fees if they prevailed.109  Also, the Court feared the 
physician could possibly be held liable for both a state and federal malpractice 
claim.110 
                                                                
101Id.  
102Id.  
103Id. at 231 (holding that “[b]ased on our understanding of the matters just discussed, we 
think Congress did not intend Carle or any other HMO to be treated as a fiduciary to the extent 
that it makes mixed eligibility decisions acting through its physicians.”). 
104Id. at 232 (arguing that “[p]rivate trustees do not make treatment judgments, whereas 
treatment judgments are what physicians reaching mixed decisions do make, by definition.”). 
105Pegram at 232. 
106Id.  
107Id. at 233-34. 
108Id. at 235. 
109Id. at 236 (“we can be fairly sure that Congress did not create fiduciary obligations out 
of concern that state plaintiffs were not suing often enough, or were paying too much in legal 
fees.”). 
110Pegram at 236 (arguing that “not only would an HMO be liable as a fiduciary in the 
first instance for its own breach of fiduciary duty committed through the acts of its physician 
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The Court, in a unanimous decision, reversed the Seventh Circuit decision 
holding “mixed eligibility decisions by HMO physicians are not fiduciary decisions 
under ERISA” and thus Herdrich’s ERISA count failed to state a claim.111  
III.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Health Management Organization 
1.  Historical Background and Function of HMOs 
Traditional medical care in the United States has been provided on a “fee-for-
service” basis in which the physician charges a certain amount for each procedure 
performed (i.e. general physical exam, vaccination, tonsillectomy).112  Physicians 
were faced with very few constraints and practiced more or less how they wanted.113  
Insurance companies simply paid the bills submitted to them from the physicians 
with little review.114  Most insurers even let the physicians determine both the rates 
and terms of reimbursement.115  In this type of system, a physician’s financial 
incentive is to provide more care, not less.116  
In addition to the use of the “fee-for-service” system, non-economic factors have 
caused the cost of health care to continually rise.  Physicians have a desire to please 
patients and to convince them that they are receiving high-quality health care, thus 
they order more tests and procedures.117  Also, our medical care system functions in 
                                                          
employee, but the physician employee would also be subject to liability on the same basic 
analysis that would charge the HMO.”). 
111Id. at 237. 
112Id. at 218 (explaining that “the physician bills the patient for services provided or, if 
there is insurance and the doctor is willing, submits the bill for the patient’s care to the insurer, 
for payment subject to the terms of the insurance.”). 
113ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 543 (citing Jonathan Weiner & Gregory de Lissovy, 
Razing a Tower of Babel: A Taxonomy for Managed Care and Health Insurance Plans, 18 J. 
HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & L. 75, 76-78 (1993) (explaining that “[i]nsurance companies usually 
served as passive go-betweens: the intermediary between the employer and provider.”). 
114Id. (explaining that “[w]ith little scrutiny they paid bills submitted to them on a fee-for-
service (FFS), retrospective basis.”).  
115Id. (further explaining “[l]ike other indemnity-orientated policies, underwriting losses 
experiences by the carrier were ultimately passed to the purchaser in the form of increased 
premiums.”). 
116HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., MANAGED CARE: INTEGRATING THE DELIVERY AND 
FINANCING OF HEALTH CARE, PART A 3 (1996).  “Physicians play a key role in determining 
what medical resources are used.”  Supra. “Once an individual decides to seek care, 
physicians either strongly influence, or directly make, most of the decisions that determine the 
cost of care.”  Id.  “Unfortunately, most physicians have had neither the knowledge or the 
incentive to be concerned about cost.”  Id.  
117Id. at 4. 
304 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 16:289 
an environment of constantly changing technology, which may push a physician to 
do more than just provide only necessary and effective care.118   
The threat of malpractice suits against physicians also adds to the increased cost 
of health care.  The physician community’s fear of adverse malpractice judgements 
caused physicians to practice “defensive medicine.”119  “Defensive medicine” 
involves the utilization of unnecessary medical tests in order to limit the physician’s 
potential liability for malpractice, but in the long run it caused skyrocketing health 
care costs.120  These rising costs made managed care a necessity.121 
Managed care has been around since the 1930s when the first prepaid medical 
group practices were established.122  The group practices would become the 
forerunners to modern HMOs.123  These group practices were established as a way to 
improve access to quality health care and as a vehicle to provide basic medical 
services.124  Since the 1930s, there has been an explosion of HMOs, largely due in 
response to the ever-rising cost of healthcare.125  By 1995, more than 140 million 
privately insured Americans, or seventy-eight percent, were members of some kind 
of managed care plan.126 
                                                                
118See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART A, supra note 116, at 3-4. In addition, new 
technologies can use more resources then they replace.  Id. at 5.  Some new technologies are 
beneficial in improving patient welfare, however, others contribute little to improved health 
status.  Id. “The proliferation of new technologies reflect Americans’ general tendency to 
place excessive reliance on technology and medical intervention to manage health care 
problems.”  Id. 
119Corrine P. Parver & Kimberly Alyson Martinez, Holding Decision Makers Liable: 
Assessing Liability Under A Managed Health Care System, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 199, 202 
(1999). 
120Id. at 202. “In addition, the cost of litigating and settling those disputes that go to court 
adds to malpractice premium costs, which are ultimately translated into higher provider fees.”  
HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART A, supra note 116, at 6.  Also, states that have not placed 
limits on malpractice award for punitive damages contribute to the rising costs of health care. 
Id. 
121See Parver, supra note 119, at 202. 
122See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART B, supra note 5, at 2.  Kaiser Foundation offered 
its first health care plans in the 1930s. See, Parver, supra note 119, at 203. 
123See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART B, supra note 5, at 2. 
124Id.  
125Id. at 2.  In addition, a rapid expansion of HMOs occurred when Congress passed the 
Health Maintenance Organization Act [hereinafter HMO Act] in 1973.  See Parver, supra note 
119, at 204.  This legislation created industry growth by providing federal grants and loans to 
HMOs qualifying under the act.  Id.  The HMO Act originally defined an HMO as “a public or 
private entity that provides basis and supplemental health services to its enrollees, without 
limiting the time or cost of those services.”  HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART B, supra note 5, 
at 166. The statute was amended in 1988 to permit HMOs to provide at least ten percent of 
their health services through out-of-network physicians and charge reasonable deductibles for 
those out-of-network services.  Id. at 167.  
126See ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 544. Managed care not only affects privately insured 
persons.  Id.  “By 1996 one-third of the nation’s nearly 36 million Medicaid beneficiaries were 
enrolled in some form of managed care.”  Id. In addition, nine percent of the Medicare 
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There can be significant variations among the different types of modern 
HMOs.127  However, four main characteristics are found in all HMO systems.128  
First, HMOs establish arrangements with selected providers to furnish a 
comprehensive set of health care services to enrollees.129  Second, HMOs create and 
utilize explicit standards for the selection of their health care providers.130  Third, all 
HMOs implement formal programs for ongoing quality assurance and utilization 
review programs.131  Finally, most HMOs utilize financial incentives to enrollees to 
encourage the use of providers and procedures covered by the HMO.132 
“Experts in managed care note that there is no universally accepted managed care 
terminology.”133  Despite its many forms, HMOs can be defined as: 
Any health coverage arrangement in which, for a pre-set fee . . . a 
company sells a defined package of benefits to a purchaser, with services 
furnished to enrolled members through a network of participating 
providers who operate under written contractual or employment 
agreements, and whose selection and authority to furnish covered benefits 
is controlled by the managed care company.134 
Regardless of the type of HMO, all managed care plans combine traditional 
notions of insurance with medical care itself, selling care from physicians who are 
members of the HMO network to purchasers for a pre-negotiated fee.135  The HMO 
assumes the financial risk of providing the benefits promised in the contract and 
keeps the money paid regardless of the usage of health benefits by the participant.136  
For example, if the participant becomes expensively ill, the HMO is responsible for 
                                                          
population, which is over three million beneficiaries, were members of Medicare managed 
care plans.  Id. 
127See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART B, supra note 5, at 2. 
128Id. 
129Id.  See also discussion infra Part III.A.3.b (discussing the cost-containment technique 
of panel selection in which the HMO manages care by encouraging, and sometime requiring, 
its members to use only certain facilities or physicians). 
130See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., B, supra note 5, at 2. 
131Id.  See also discussion infra Part III.A.3.a (discussing utilization review programs in 
the HMO setting). 
132See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., B, supra note 5, at 2.  See also discussion infra Part 
III.A.3.c (discussing HMO financial incentive programs). 
133ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 551 (quoting Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, 
Managed Care Plan Performance since 1980: A Literature Analysis, 271 JAMA 1512 (1994) 
(quotations omitted). 
134Id. at 551-52. “What usually distinguishes the managed care plans from those that are 
more traditional is that there is a party that takes responsibility for integrating and coordinating 
the financing and delivery of services across what previously were fragmented provider and 
payer entities.”  Id. at 545 (quoting Weiner, supra note 113, at 77). 
135Id. at 552. 
136Pegram at 216. 
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the treatment agreed upon even if its cost exceeds the participant’s premiums.137  
Physicians are required to administer any “medically necessary care” that is required 
under the contract.138  Unlike the “fee-for-service” program, physicians are given an 
incentive not to provide unnecessary medical care.139  HMOs enable employers who 
offer health care benefits and their employees an opportunity to save money.140  In 
1999, approximately sixty million people in the United States were enrolled in HMO 
programs.141 
2.  Types of HMOs 
There are several models of HMOs.142  HMO models are defined by the 
organizational structure of the participating physicians and the relationship between 
the HMO and the contracting physicians or physician organizations.143  The three 
main types of HMOs are: the staff model, the independent practice association model 
(IPA), and the group model.144  
a.  The Staff Model  
The staff model is comprised of physicians who are employed by and are paid a 
salary by the HMO.145  “Frequently, the employed physicians provide services 
exclusively to the enrollees of a specific plan.”146  Staff model arrangements provide 
a high degree of control over both the cost and delivery of medical services.147  
                                                                
137Id. 
138See Christine E. Brasel, Comment, Managed Care Liability: State Legislation May Arm 
Angry Members Legal Ammo To Fire At Their MCOs For Cost Containment Tactics . . . But 
Could It Backfire?, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 449, 451 (1999).  The definition of the term “medical 
necessity” has been a topic of debate in the courts.  See ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 213 
(citing Dallis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 574 F. Supp 547, 550 (N.D. Ga. 1983)) (stating, “[n]o 
insurance is afforded . . . as to charges . . . for care, treatment, services or supplies which are 
not necessary for the treatment of the injury or illness concerned”)).  See also Siegal v. Health 
Care Serv. Corp., 401 N.E.2d 1037 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (stating “where there is no ambiguity 
that contract limits coverage to medically necessary services, ‘medically necessary’ is an issue 
of fact to be decided by the jury.”). 
139See Brasel, supra note 138, at 451. 
140Id. 
141Id. 
142See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART B, supra note 5, at 44. 
143Id. 
144Brasel, supra note 138, at 451.  Not all HMOs fit neatly into one of the above listed 
categories.  Id. at 452.  In addition there is a PPO in which physicians, hospitals, and other 
health care providers join together to provide services to members who generally pay a 
premium to the PPO which reimburses the health care providers for services rendered.  Id. 
145Id. at 451. 
146See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART B, supra note 5, at 44. 
147Id. (arguing that the Staff Model “may be desirable and/or necessary where the local 
provider community is unwilling or has limited capacity to enter into HMO contracts or serve 
the plan’s enrollment.”). 
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Developing and operating health care facilities and employing health care 
professions requires a significant amount of capital and capabilities beyond those of 
most insurers.148  Thus, developing a staff model HMO is only appropriate in 
situations in which there is an insufficient supply of independent physicians in the 
community willing to participate in the HMO and the HMO has sufficient capital.149 
b.  The IPA Model 
In contrast, the IPA model is composed of a group of physicians that contract 
with an HMO to provide services to the HMO’s contract members.150  However, IPA 
physicians also treat individuals who are not members of HMOs.151  The physicians 
in an IPA model are paid a fee based on the services that are rendered or through 
capitation.152  Capitation is a method by which physicians are paid a fixed amount 
per patient and receive the same amount irrespective of the quantity of services that 
are provided to the HMO contract member.153  
The IPA model has at least one principal disadvantage.  When the IPA model is 
compared to the staff model, it is more difficult to control costs and affect the 
practice patterns of independent physicians.154  Control is especially difficult when 
only a small portion of the physician’s practice is under the HMO.155  
However, IPAs are the fastest growing type of HMO.156  This growth can be 
attributed to the limited liability assumed in the IPA setting.157  The HMOs liability 
is most limited in this model due to the several layers of separation between the 
HMO and the physician.158  “Control in terms of an agency relationship is more 
difficult to establish here.”159  When a patient goes to the doctor’s office instead of 
the HMO office, proving reliance on the doctor as an HMO employee rather than an 
independent contractor is more troublesome.160 
                                                                
148Id. at 45. 
149Id.  Other important factors include: (a) the HMO has a high market penetration; (b) 
there is access to sufficient capital; and, (c) there exists extensive familiarity with operating 
health care facilities and managing health professionals.  See id. at 45. 
150See, Brasel, supra note 138, at 451. IPA is the term used to describe the Independent 
Practice Association Model.  See Parver, supra note 119, at 204. 
151Id. at 452. IPA doctors work in their own offices, employ their own staffs and keep their 
own records.  See Parver, supra note 119, at 204.  
152See Brasel, supra note 138, at 452. 
153Id. 
154See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART B, supra note 5, at 47. 
155Id. 
156See Parver, supra note 119, at 205. 
157Id. 
158Id. 
159Id. 
160Id. at 205. 
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c.  The Group Model 
Finally, the group model is generally described as a contract between an 
employer and a medical group affiliated with the HMO to render medical services to 
its employees.161  In the group model, fees are paid to the medical group on a 
“capitation basis.”162  The HMO pays a physician group a negotiated, per capita rate, 
which the medical group distributes among the individual physicians in a variety of 
ways.163 
The above described types of HMOs have different levels of legal liability.  
Overall, the legal liability of an HMO for the health care that it manages for its 
members depends on the amount and level of control exerted by the managed care 
organization over physicians.164  The liability is the greatest in the staff model and 
lower in the IPA and Group models.165  In IPA and Group models there are more 
layers of separation between the physicians and the HMO thus the control exerted by 
the HMO over the physician is lower.166  In the staff-model the HMO directly 
employs the doctors which sets up an employer-employee relationship.  Thus, the 
legal liability of the HMO is lighter in this model.167 
3.  Controlling Costs and Cost Containment 
Health care reform in the 1980s and 1990s has focused on cost containment.168  
As with other risk-bearing organizations, HMOs take steps to control costs.169  There 
are three main types of cost containment methods utilized by HMOs: Utilization 
Review; Panel Selection; and Direct Physician Financial Incentives. All three 
methods are discussed in more detail below. 
a.  Utilization Review 
Utilization review has been defined as “a comprehensive evaluation of the 
efficiency, appropriateness, and medical necessity of healthcare.”170  These programs 
                                                                
161See Brasel, supra note 138, at 452. 
162Id.  See also discussion infra Part III.A.3.C.2 (discussing physician capitation 
reimbursement which is normally a fixed member per month payment or a percentage of the 
premium payment for the contracted services). 
163HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART B, supra note 5, at 3.  See also discussion infra Part 
III.A.3.C.2 (discussing physician capitation reimbursement programs). 
164Parver, supra note 119, at 204. 
165Id. 
166Id. 
167Id. 
168Parver, supra note 119, at 202 (arguing that “Corporate America has recognized that 
rapidly increasing health care costs decrease competitiveness in the new global market.”).  In 
addition, health care costs consume an increasingly large share of state and federal and federal 
budgets, thus limiting other policy objectives.  Id. 
169Pegram at 216. 
170J. Scott Andresen, Is Utilization Review The Practice of Medicine?, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 
431, 433 (1998). 
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are designed to reduce unnecessary medical services.171  Utilization review is not a 
new concept; health insurers have always reviewed medical claims on the basis of 
medical necessity.172  
There are two main types of utilization review; retrospective and prospective.173  
In general, a retrospective utilization review occurs after the medical treatment has 
already been given and a prospective review occurs before the treatment has been 
conducted.174  Traditionally, utilization review has been conducted on a retrospective 
basis and the patient was assured treatment regardless of whether the claim was 
eventually paid or denied by the HMO.175  
In contrast, prospective review does not carry the same assurances of medical 
treatment as retrospective review.176  With prospective review, treatment is often 
denied until the questions of payment are settled.177  Prospective review commonly is 
required for facility admissions, expensive diagnostic testing, surgical procedures, 
and referrals to physicians or facilities outside the particular HMO.178  Thus, through 
prospective utilization review the HMO is playing an active role in determining both 
the course and scope of the patient’s medical treatment.179  
b.  Panel Selection 
In a panel selection and de-selection system, the HMO manages the care 
indirectly by encouraging, and in many cases requiring, its members to use only 
certain physicians or facilities.180  Physicians and facilities are often jointly termed 
                                                                
171See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART A, supra note 116, at 239.  “The purpose of 
utilization review is to assure that only procedures deemed medically necessary and 
appropriate to the patient’s needs are reimbursed.”  Andresen, supra note 170, at 432. 
172Id. at 434.  Medical Necessity is a term used by “insurers to describe medical treatment 
that is appropriate and rendered in accordance with generally accepted standards of medical 
practice.”  See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART A, supra note 116, at 232.  But see supra 
note 138 (discussing the lack of agreement in the courts regarding the definition of medical 
necessity). 
173See Parver, supra note 119, at 205. In addition, prospective review can be further 
divided into pre-admission and concurrent review.  Id.  See also Andresen, supra note 170, at 
434 (describing concurrent utilization review in greater detail). 
174Parver, supra note 119, at 205. 
175See Andresen, supra note 170, at 434. 
176Parver, supra note 119, at 205. 
177Id. 
178See Andresen, supra note 170, at 435. 
179Id. (explaining that “review agents . . . apply the patient’s characteristics to the 
preestablished UR [Utilization Review] criteria for the particular diagnosis or treatment at 
issue . . . [and] if the criteria are  not met . . . the case is forwarded to the UR administrator for 
a final determination”).  As a result of this process, “utilization review places an MCO, or its 
UR director, in a position where they may be substituting their judgement for that of the 
attending physician directly providing the care.”  Id.  
180Henry T. Greely, Direct Financial Incentives In Managed Care: Unanswered 
Questions, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 53, 56 (1996). 
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providers.181  The HMO selects the providers that are to be a part of their plan based 
on several criteria.182  Most important among the criteria is the cost to the HMO.183  
The providers selected by the HMO are encouraged to be economical in their 
practice style.184  The providers are aware that if they choose not to meet the HMO’s 
standards for both cost and practice style they will no longer be a part of that 
particular HMO panel and thus de-selected.185  This situation creates an “indirect” 
financial incentive for the providers because de-selection causes the provider to lose 
HMO patients and in the end reduces their overall income.186 
c.  Direct Physician Financial Incentives 
Direct financial incentives were also found in the old “fee for service” system 
where the more the physician did, the more the physician was paid.187  However, the 
financial incentives in a managed care plan are different.188  In the HMO system the 
incentives are aimed at discouraging the physician from performing unnecessary 
treatment.189  The HMO system focuses on providing the “right” amount of care 
rather than performing unnecessary preemptive medicine.190  The Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990 loosely defined a physician incentive plan as “any 
compensation arrangement between an eligible organization and a physician or 
physician group that may directly or indirectly have the effect of limiting services 
provided with respect to individuals enrolled with the organization.”191  Four general 
approaches are usually utilized: salary, capitation, bonus and profit sharing.192  
                                                                
181Id. 
182Id. 
183Id. (explaining that “these costs encompass both the amount of the fees charged by the 
provider, often heavily discounted, and the cost of that provider’s style of practice.”). 
184See Greely, supra note 180, at 56.  In addition, panel selection programs may reduce 
costs by limiting the number of providers in the plan’s network.  See ROSENBLATT, supra note 
4, at 559. 
185Id. (arguing that “the providers are encouraged to be economical not by direct micro-
management, but by knowing that they will no longer be on the panel should they fail to meet 
the plan’s standards for the cost of practice style.”). 
186Id.  See also ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 559 (“[t]he threat of network exclusion 
represents a potentially powerful tool for ensuring compliance with coverage and utilization 
review standards and guidelines.”).  
187See Greely, supra note 180, at 56. 
188Id. 
189Id.  See also discussion infra III.A.3.a (discussing the utilization review process and 
how that process discourages the performance of unnecessary treatment). 
190Greely, supra note 180, at 56. 
191Id. (quoting The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, S 
4204(a)(1)(B), Stat. 1388-108 (1990) amending, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 mm(I). 
192Id. at 57. 
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i.  Salary 
In a salaried situation, the physician’s income is set annually by the HMO 
through the issuance of a salary.193  The physician does not have the “fee-for-service” 
incentive to do more for the patients in order to make more money.194  The physician 
in a salary situation understands that his salary can be raised, lowered, or that he may 
even be terminated if the HMO does not agree with his practice patterns.195 
ii.  Capitation 
In a capitation situation, the physician is generally paid a set amount monthly for 
each of the individual HMO patients for whom he is responsible.196  To determine the 
appropriate amount of payment, the services provided by the physician must be 
carefully defined in order to estimate the total cost for the care.197  This determination 
may include adjustments for the age and gender of the physician’s patients.198  For 
example, the physician may be paid twenty-five dollars per-member, per-month, 
which is also referred to as PMPM.199  In addition, many HMOs make a portion of 
the capitation payment dependent on the number and length of hospital 
admissions.200  For example, if the PMPM is twenty-five dollars, five dollars per 
month is set aside and paid to the physician only if certain utilization targets are 
met.201 
The main point is that the physician is paid the same amount of money each 
month for each HMO patient regardless of the number of visits or the cost of the 
services that are provided.202  “In its purest form, if the doctor spends less than the 
capitated amount, she makes a profit on that patient; if she spends more, she takes a 
loss.”203 
                                                                
193Id.  Staff Model HMOs usually pay physicians on a salaried basis.  See HEALTH INS. 
ASS’N OF AM., PART A, supra note 116, at 56.  See also discussion infra Part III.A.2.a 
(discussing Staff Model HMOs). 
194See Greely, supra note 180, at 57.  See also infra notes 112-15 (discussing the fee-for-
service payment system). 
195See Greely, supra note 180, at 57.  Due to the fact that the performance of the physician 
in a Staff Model HMO “has a direct bearing on the financial health of the ‘HMO,’ their 
performance is the target of incentives and risk agreements.”  See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., 
PART A, supra note 116, at 56. 
196See Greely, supra note 180, at 57. 
197See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART A, supra note 116, at 56. 
198Id. 
199Id. 
200Id. 
201Id. at 57. 
202HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART A, supra note 116, at 56. 
203Greely, supra note 180, at 57. 
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Overall, there is one important difference between salary and capitation as far as 
the physician's personal incentives.204  In the capitation situation, physicians have an 
incentive to increase the number of patients for whom they have responsibility and in 
the salary situation; physicians have an incentive to reduce the number of patients for 
whom they have responsibility.205  In principal, capitation and salary are 
interchangeable since they both result in physicians being paid a fixed amount of 
compensation no matter how many or how few services they provide.206 
iii.  Bonus 
In the bonus situation, the physicians may be paid during a fixed period under 
any system but at the end of the period they receive a bonus.207  The bonus is based 
on the HMO’s financial results in that year and the individual physician’s 
contribution to them.208  The method under which the bonus is determined can 
differ.209  Many times bonus arrangements are used to control the use of ancillary 
services.210  Ancillary services are defined as health care services that are conducted 
by providers other than a primary care physician.211  Examples of ancillary services 
are laboratory tests and radiology screenings.212  HMOs may set aside a separate pool 
of funds to pay for ancillary services.213  If at the end of the year there are funds still 
left in the pool, the funds are distributed to the physicians as a bonus.214  Thus, the 
                                                                
204See Orentlicher, supra note 8, at 159.  However, “even with their [capitation's] built-in 
incentive to limit care, pure salary and capitation may not provide sufficient incentive for 
physicians to limit the costs of care provided to their patients.”  Id. at 159-60 (arguing that 
physicians rely on different medical services to provide care to their patients and that 
capitation may just cause the physician to “alter the mix of services” provided to their patients, 
causing costs overall to actually rise.). 
205Id. at 159. 
206Id. 
207See Greely, supra note 180, at 59. 
208Id. 
209Id. 
210Id.  Fee-withholds and expanded capitation are also used to restrain physicians from 
overusing ancillary services.  See Orentlicher, supra note 8, at 160. 
211See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART B, supra note 5, at 201 (defining “ancillary 
services.”).  A primary care physician [hereinafter “PCP”] can be defined as the primary 
deliverer and manager of an HMO member’s care and is central to controlling costs and 
utilization.  Id. at 210.  The PCP provides basic care to the member including the basic care of 
the member and any follow up care that may be needed.  Id.  Usually PCPs are physisians 
practicing in such areas as internal medicine, family practice, and pediatrics.  Id. at 211. 
212Id. at 89. 
213See Orentlicher, supra note 8, at 160. 
214Id. 
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physicians recognize that they can increase the amount of their compensation if they 
reduce the use of ancillary services.215 
iv.  Profit Sharing 
Under the profit sharing method physicians receive a negotiated share of the 
HMO’s profits.216  The physicians may receive this share as owners of the plan or 
through a contractual agreement.217  This method is sometimes used to determine the 
bonus payment as described above.218  Individual profit-sharing plans may differ 
greatly.219 
All of these methods can be used and many of them can be combined.220  For 
example, a salary system will usually have some kind of bonus that may include 
some profit sharing.221  A bonus may be determined as a result of a comparison to 
expected capitation results and a capitation system itself may include a bonus.222  
“The number of possible systems of direct financial incentives is virtually 
unlimited.”223 
d.  The Use of Direct Financial Incentives By HMOs 
Due to the various combinations of financial incentives that may be used by 
HMOs, it is difficult to ascertain the number of HMOs using a certain incentive 
system and, furthermore, the number of patients receiving care under each financial 
arrangement.224  However, we do know that financial incentives are greatly used.225  
In 1995, a report based on California HMOs found that financial incentives were 
commonly used by HMOs.226  The report stated that a 1987 survey indicated that 
eighty-five percent of California HMOs used financial incentives and a 1988 study 
                                                                
215Id. (indicating that bonus-type “[f]inancial incentives to limit care discourage 
physicians from providing high levels of care by transferring from the health plan to the 
physician some of the financial risk of costly medical care.”). 
216See Greely, supra note 180, at 59. 
217Id. 
218Id. 
219Id. 
220Id. 
221Greely, supra note 180, at 59. 
222Id. 
223Id.  
224Id. (stating that “our next problem is to determine how often each [reimbursement] 
method is actually being used.”). 
225Id. at 60. 
226See Greely, supra note 180, at 60 (discussing a report found in HEALTH EDUC. & 
HUMAN SERV. DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, MEDICAID MANAGED CARE: MORE COMPETITION 
AND OVERSIGHT WOULD IMPROVE CALIFORNIA’S EXPANSION PLAN (1995) (GAO Report)).  The 
report noted, “there are no reliable current data regarding the extent to which HMOs use 
financial incentive arrangements or the prevalence of the different types of arrangements.”  Id. 
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showed that ninety-five percent of HMOs used them.227  The California report 
concluded “it has become increasingly common for HMOs to capitate physicians . . . 
for all medical services including inpatient care.”228  
Information on a national level has not proved to be any more helpful.229  We do 
know that some forms of compensation are more popular than others in certain HMO 
settings.  For example, staff models prefer salary systems, IPA models do not.230  
Profit sharing models are not popular while capitation systems are popular.231  
e.  Cases Discussing the Use of Financial Incentives 
Legal involvement regarding the question of whether an HMO can be held liable 
for medical malpractice because of financial incentives or financial risk imposed on 
physicians, is in its infancy.232  Currently, there are few published court opinions 
discussing the subject; however, legal involvement in this area is likely to grow 
significantly.233  
An unpublished Michigan trial court opinion allowed a jury to evaluate how the 
physician financial incentives operated in a particular case.234  In Bush v. Dake235 the 
                                                                
227Id. 
228Id. 
229Id. 
230See Greeley, supra note 180, at 61. In addition, it is difficult to calculate how many 
patients are covered by what kinds of direct financial incentive systems.  See Id.  “Even when 
a plan uses the same general approach in compensating physicians, its arrangements with 
different groups may include different provisions, leading to different incentives.”  Id. Thus, 
we cannot just find out what methods different HMOs use and then add up the number of their 
members.  See Id. at 61-62. “To determine how many patients are covered by each type of 
direct financial incentive system, we would have to ask HMOs what systems they use to pay 
which physicians, and then ask how many of their members use each set of differently 
compensated physicians.”  Id. at 62. 
231Greely, supra note 180, at 61. 
232See ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 1069. 
233Id.  See Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 99 Cal. App. 3d 560 (1979) (regarding 
one of the few published court opinions discussing physician financial incentive programs). 
This case involved a suit against HMO alleging negligent delay of a biopsy as the cause of 
patient’s death.  Id. at 564.  The plaintiff’s third cause of action rested on the theory that the 
health plan utilized a system whereby the individual doctors were encouraged, by an incentive 
plan, to be conservative in ordering unnecessary tests and treatments.  Id. at 565. The plaintiff 
argued that he was fraudulently led to believe that he would receive the “best quality” of care 
and treatment.  Id. The court dismissed claim of HMO fraudulent concealment of physician 
financial incentives on the grounds that such incentives were recommended by professional 
organizations and “required” by the HMO Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 300e.  Id. (holding that 
“we can see in the plan no suggestion that individual doctors act negligently or that they 
refrain from recommending whatever diagnostic procedures or treatments the accepted 
standards of their profession require.”). 
234ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 1069-71. The Rosenblatt case book has printed the 
unpublished 1989 Saginaw County, Michigan trial court opinion.  Id.  The case is Bush v. 
Dake, No. 86-25767NM-2 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1989) (unreported).  All facts stated are taken from 
the version printed in the case book. 
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plaintiffs alleged that their HMO’s system of financial incentives was contrary to 
public policy and the use of this system constituted negligence, gross negligence, 
fraud, a breach of trust, and a tortious breach of the relationship between the plaintiff 
patient and her doctors.236  The case arose out of the alleged failure by the HMO 
physician to timely diagnose and treat the plaintiff’s cervical cancer.237  The HMO in 
this case set aside a certain amount of money each year for a “referral pool” and a 
“hospital/ancillary pool” for the HMO physicians.238  A referral is the transfer of a 
patient from their primary doctor to a specialty physician for special care or 
diagnostic testing.239  As patients are referred to specialists, money in these funds is 
depleted.240  Any money that is left in these pools at the end of the year is divided 
amongst the HMO and its physicians.241  
The plaintiffs contended it was this incentive agreement that led in part to the late 
diagnosis of her cervical cancer.242  The plaintiff had requested a referral from her 
primary physician in order to see a specialist in obstetrics and gynecology regarding 
vaginal bleeding.243  The plaintiff was given a referral to see the specialist; however, 
when she requested an additional referral due to her persistent condition, she was not 
allowed one.244  It turned out that a simple diagnostic test, a pap smear, would have 
revealed the cancer at an earlier stage.245  Pap smears can be done by the primary 
physician but the primary physician is not paid anything in addition to the existing 
capitation payment for performing the test.246 
The court dismissed the plaintiff’s allegation that the incentive programs were 
contrary to public policy; however, the court found that there was a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the HMO’s incentive system in and of itself proximately 
contributed to the malpractice in the case.247  The court stated “[d]ocumentary 
                                                          
235ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 1069-71. 
236See ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 1069. 
237Id. at 1070. 
238Id. 
239See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART A, supra note 116, at 237 (defining “referral”). 
240See ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 1070. 
241Id. 
242Id.  Plaintiffs contended that “the system in question is wrongful, in that it provides the 
physicians involved with financial disincentives to properly treat, refer, and hospitalize 
patients.”  Id. at 1070-71.  The plaintiffs further contended that the court should find “a) that 
the system violates public policy and b) that there is a jury question presented as to whether 
the system itself contributed to the malpractice in this case.”  Id. at 1071. 
243See ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 1070. 
244Id. 
245Id.  A Pap test is an examination under a microscope of cells collected from the cervix 
that are placed on a slide and specially stained to reveal cancerous and non-cancerous changes 
in the cells.  MEDICINENET.COM MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 21.  Cervical and uterine 
cancer can be detected in their early stages with this test.  See id. 
246See ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 1070. 
247Id. at 1071. 
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evidence has been presented which supports the plaintiffs’ theory that the manner in 
which the system operated in this case contributed to the improper treatment and 
delay in diagnosis of Mrs. Bush’s cancerous condition.”248 
In addition, cases have alleged that HMO financial arrangements create personal 
financial interests for the physician, which are against the patient’s best interests.  A 
noteworthy case, Fox v. Health Net,249 concerned the denial by an HMO of an 
experimental treatment for metastatic breast cancer, which resulted in a jury verdict 
of eighty-nine million dollars against a California HMO.250  The case included 
charges that the personal, financial interests of the physician medical director making 
the decision on the procedure, affected the result.251  
A third case involved a cancer patient who died in her early thirties of colon 
cancer.252  The complaint alleged that the cancer should have been diagnosed at an 
earlier and more treatable stage, but that the capitation agreement created by the 
patient’s physicians made them reluctant to spend the money needed for the relevant 
tests.253  The suit did not include the health plan but instead added a cause of action 
for breach of fiduciary duty, arguing that the managed care contract created an 
impermissible conflict between the interests of the patient and the physician.254  
Before the case went to the jury, the judge granted a directed verdict on this cause of 
action, removing it from the jury.255  However, the testimony was not forgotten by 
the jury as they returned a verdict of $3 million on the remaining malpractice 
charges.256 
Although the previous cases are unpublished decisions, they are proof of the 
existence of claims based on breaches of fiduciary duty premised on financial 
                                                                
248Id. (holding that the question should be submitted to the jury for determination at trial). 
249See Greely, supra note 180.   
250See Greely, supra note 180, at 75.  The Fox case was settled before the appeal was 
heard, so it did not result in a reported opinion.  The case is well described in Christine 
Woolsey, Jury Hits HMO for Coverage Denial, BUS. INS., Jan. 3, 1994, at 1, 23 (describing 
the complaint and the decision of the California Superior Court).  See also Greely, supra note 
180, at n.42. 
251See Greely, supra note 180, at 75 (explaining that the HMO’s medical director was the 
person who decide whether the procedure sought was experimental). 
252Id.  The facts from the Ching case are taken from the Greely article. Greely bases his 
description of the case from a copy of the complaint and David R. Olmos, Cutting Medical 
Costs or Cutting Corners?, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 1995, at A1.  See Greely, supra note 180, at 
76, n.43. 
253Id. at 75.  The patient was a member of an HMO and received her care through a 
physician group that received $27.94 a month for her care.  See Id.  The complaint alleged that 
the physician group had to pay for diagnostic tests or procedures by specialists.  See Id. 
254Id. at 76.  “Mrs. Ching’s husband and young son did not sue the health plan, probably 
because of the barriers ERISA imposes.”  See Greely, supra note 180, at 76.  See also 
discussion infra Part III.B.1 (explaining ERISA preemption). 
255See Greely, supra note 180, at 76.  
256Id.  Note that this amount was reduced to $700,000 as a result of California’s cap on 
non-economic damages in medical malpractice case.  See Id. 
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incentives.  These cases present evidence that financial arrangements may present 
great influence in the decisions that physicians make for their patients. 
B.  The Effect of ERISA on Managed Care 
ERISA has been called “the most important law affecting health care in the 
United States.”257  “[ERISA] was designed to create a comprehensive, uniform 
regulatory system for self-funded employee benefit plans. . . .”258  ERISA is 
applicable to most employer-sponsored health plans, which means that ERISA’s 
guidelines cover more than one-half of all American workers.259  ERISA does not 
apply to self-employed persons or to persons whose health care insurance is not 
provided by their employer.260 
1.  ERISA Preemption 
In order to maintain uniformity by avoiding conflicting state standards, ERISA 
“supersedes any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any 
employee benefit plan.”261  The preemption applies to common law action, as well as 
actions instituted under state statutes if the actions “relate to” an employee benefits 
plan.262  “The preemption clause of ERISA has been given ‘its broadest common 
sense meaning’ by the Supreme Court.”263  The necessary relation is established by 
showing the state law has a “connection with or reference to [an employee benefit 
plan].”264  In terms of HMO liability, the preemption clause of ERISA must be 
reviewed in order to determine the validity of state law.265  When a state law cause of 
                                                                
257Brasel, supra note 138, at 453. 
258HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM. PART B, supra note 5, at 169 (explaining that “ERISA does 
not dictate the substance of employee benefit plans, but it does impose fiduciary duties on the 
administrators of such plans, as well as reporting and disclosure requirements.”). 
259See Brasel, supra note 138, at 453-54 (explaining that “when there is a dispute 
involving an employee benefit plan, the statute is triggered.”). 
260Id. at 454. In addition, the statute does not apply to employee benefit plans when the 
employee works for either a church or the government.  See id. 
261Parver, supra note 119, at 224 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994)). 
262Id.  
263Id.  See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98 (stating “Congress used the words ‘relate to’ in section 
514(a) in their broad sense”).  See also, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 
724, 739-40 (1985) (stating that ERISA broadly pre-empts state law); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. 
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (stating “in both cases [Shaw and Metropolitan] the phrase 
‘relate to’ was given its broad common-sense meaning, such that a state law ‘relates’ to a 
benefit plan ‘in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such 
a plan.’”). 
264Parver, supra note 119, at 225 (quoting Shaw at 97). 
265See Brasel, supra note 138, at 454.  When conducting a pre-emption analysis, one must 
first ask “whether the case involves an ERISA-regulated plan.”  Id. at 455.  “The existence of 
an ERISA plan is a question of fact, to be answered in light of all the surrounding 
circumstances from the point of view of a reasonable person.”  Id. (quoting McClellan v. 
Health Maintenance Org. of Pa., 604 A.2d 1053, 1063 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). 
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action is preempted by ERISA, the claim cannot be pursued and must be 
dismissed.266  Thereafter, the plaintiff’s only remedy is found in the remedy 
provisions of the ERISA statute. 
The scope of the ERISA’s preemption clause has been drawn into question and 
still remains unclear.267 Section 514 of ERISA is the substantial preemption 
section.268  In deciding whether federal law preempts a state provision, the question is 
one of congressional intent.269  “[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate 
touchstone.”270  In order to find Congress’ intent, the statutory language and structure 
must be reviewed.271  The Court finds the task of discerning congressional intent 
considerably simplified due to the broadly worded preemption provision of § 514.272  
The key to § 514(a) is found in the words “relate to.”273  Congress has used these 
words in their broadest sense by rejecting more limited preemption language and by 
using equally broad language in defining the state laws that would be preempted.274  
A state law may “relate to” a benefit plan and thus be preempted even if the law is 
not specifically designed to affect such plans or the effect is only indirect.275  On the 
other hand, preemption is not precluded simply because a state law is consistent with 
ERISA’s substantive requirements.276  Overall, § 514 indicates Congress’ intent to 
establish the regulation of employee welfare benefit plans “as exclusively a federal 
concern.”277 
                                                                
266Id. at 454. 
267Id. 
268See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM. PART B, supra note 5, at 170 (“[s]ection 514 of ERISA 
broadly establishes the federal preemption of any and all state laws that relate to any employee 
benefit plan.”). 
269See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137-38 (“[t]he question of 
whether a certain state action is preempted by federal law is one of congressional intent.”). 
270Id. (“[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone” (quoting Allis-Chalmers 
Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985))). 
271Id. (“to discern Congress’ intent we examine the explicit statutory language and the 
structure and purpose of the statute.”). 
272Id.  The Court quotes 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994) (“§ 514(a) of ERISA is as follows 
‘Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and 
subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or 
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not 
exempt under 1003(b) of this title.’”).   
273Ingersoll-Rand at 138. 
274Id.  Such state laws under the preemption include “all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, 
or other State action having the effect of law.”  29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (1994). 
275Ingersoll-Rand at 139. 
276Id. 
277See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656-657 (1995) (“we have found that in passing § 514(a), Congress 
intended ‘to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of 
benefits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and financial burden of complying 
with conflicting directives among States or between States and the Federal government . . . , 
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2.  Fiduciary Duty Under ERISA 
A fiduciary within the meaning of ERISA must be someone acting in the capacity 
of a manager, administrator, or financial advisor to a “plan.”278  A “plan” has been 
defined as a scheme decided upon in advance.279  Plans include rules governing the 
collection of premiums, definition of benefits, submission of claims and resolution of 
disagreements over the entitlements of services.280  ERISA provides that fiduciaries 
shall discharge their duties with respect to a plan “solely in the interests of the 
participants and beneficiaries. . . for the exclusive purpose of (i) providing benefits to 
participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of 
administering the plan.”281 
The responsibilities imposed by ERISA sound much like their source in the 
common law of trusts.282  The common law of trusts charges fiduciaries with a duty 
of loyalty to guarantee the beneficiaries’ interests and to administer the trust solely in 
the interests of the beneficiary.283  The seminal case on the duty of loyalty in the 
partnership setting, Meinhard v. Salmon, reinforces the strength of the duty by 
stating, “[a] trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market 
place,. . . [n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then 
the standard of behavior.”284  
Unlike a trustee under the common law, a fiduciary under ERISA may have a 
financial interest adverse to the beneficiaries.285  However, ERISA does require that 
                                                          
[and to prevent] the potential for conflict in substantive law . . . requiring the tailoring of plans 
and employer conduct to the peculiarities of the law of each jurisdiction’.’’ (quoting Ingersoll-
Rand at 142). 
278Pegram at 223 (quoting 29 U.S.C §§ 1002(21)(A)(i)-(iii) (1999)). 
279Id. (“one is left to the common understanding of the word ‘plan’ as referring to a 
scheme decided upon on advance.”). 
280Id. 
28129 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1999).  In addition, fiduciaries must discharge their duties  
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then 
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters 
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims; (C) by 
diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses, 
unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and (D) in accordance 
with the documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this 
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). 
282Pegram at 224. 
283Id. 
284Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (Cardozo, J). (“many forms of conduct 
permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound 
by fiduciary ties.”).  
285See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 224 (explaining that employers can be ERISA fiduciaries and 
still take actions to the disadvantage of the ERISA beneficiaries when the act like employers 
(e.g., firing a beneficiary for reasons unrelated to the ERISA plan or modifying the terms of 
the plan as allowed by ERISA to provide less generous benefits)).  
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the fiduciary act in adherence to the duty when making fiduciary decisions.286  Plan 
administrators are fiduciaries only to the extent that they act in such a capacity in 
relation to a plan.287  Thus, “[i]n every case charging breach of ERISA fiduciary duty 
. . . the threshold question is not whether the actions of some person employed to 
provide services under the plan adversely affected a plan beneficiary’s interests, but 
whether that person was acting as a fiduciary (that is, performing a fiduciary 
function) when taking the action subject to the complaint.”288 
3.  The “Savings Clause” and Common-Law Claims 
While ERISA broadly preempts state laws that relate to an employee-benefit 
plan, that preemption is substantially qualified by the “insurance savings clause.”289  
This clause states that nothing in ERISA “shall be construed to exempt or relieve any 
person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or 
securities.”290  This clause saves state laws, which regulate insurance, banking, or 
securities, from preemption.291  Although the “savings clause” on its face would 
seem to protect claims regarding employee health benefit plans that provide health 
insurance from ERISA preemption, and thus allow the claims under state law, it is 
not that simple.292 
The seminal Supreme Court case discussing the “savings clause” and its impact 
on the insurance industry is Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. 
Massachusetts.293  In this case, the Court set forth a three-factor test to establish 
whether a state law falls under the “saving clause,” and hence is not preempted by 
ERISA.294  The factors are: “(1) whether the practice has the effect of transferring or 
spreading a policyholder’s risk; (2) whether the practice is an integral part of the 
policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; (3) whether the practice is 
limited to entities within the insurance industry.”295   
The Court applied the three-factor test to a common-law cause of action for 
breach of contract and tortious bad faith against an insurance company in Pilot Life 
Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux.296  The complaint in Pilot Life alleged improper 
                                                                
286Id. (“ERISA does require, however, that the fiduciary with two hats wear only one at a 
time, and where the fiduciary hat when making fiduciary decisions.”). 
28729 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1999). 
288Pegram at 226. 
289See Metropolitan Life Ins.Co. at 739. 
29029 U.S.C § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1999). 
291Id. 
292See Griner, supra note 12, at 914. 
293Metropolitan Life Ins.Co. at 724. 
294Id. at 743 (stating that “cases interpreting the scope of the McCarren-Ferguson Act have 
identified three criteria relevant to determining whether a particular practice falls within that 
Act’s reference to the ‘business of insurance.”).  
295Id.  See also Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982); Group Life 
& Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979). 
296Pilot Life Ins. Co. at 41. 
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processing of a claim for benefits under an employee benefit plan.297  The Court 
found that the common-law of bad faith does not effect a spreading of policyholder 
risk, that the connection to the insurer-insured relationship is “attenuated” at best.298  
The Court stated that roots of bad faith are “firmly planted” in tort and contract law; 
the application of these principals was not limited to the insurance industry.299 
Herein lies the roadblock for patients bringing tort or contract claims against their 
HMO. Based on Pilot Life, the savings clause will not save any state laws of “general 
application,” such as common-law principals of contract and tort.300  Therefore, any 
type of state tort action against a HMO for negligence in a utilization review decision 
or medical necessity determination under an ERISA qualified plan would not fall 
under the “savings clause” for insurance regulation and the common law cause of 
action is preempted by ERISA.301  A patient bringing a claim of this kind would thus 
need to prove the claim using the ERISA statute and not relevant state law. 
“Perhaps the most unjust aspect of ERISA preemption is that it destroys a 
plaintiff’s chance at a level playing field.”302  “When a health plan is an ERISA plan, 
preemption is fairly certain for at least some claims that otherwise would be 
viable.”303  However, when a health plan does not fall under ERISA, there is no 
ERISA preemption and the patient is allowed full recovery on the same theories of 
poor care and wrongdoing by an HMO.304  In contrast, patients in health plans that 
fall under ERISA guidelines can only recover the value of the benefit denied.305  
Many feel this is an inadequate remedy for a patient who has been seriously injured 
or has died due to the negligence of an HMO.306  “[C]ourts . . . are becoming 
                                                                
297Id. at 43 (“although Dedeaux sought permanent disability benefits following the 1975 
accident, Pilot Life terminated his benefits after two years.”).   
298Id. at 50-51. 
299Id. at 50. 
300See Griner, supra note 12, at 916. 
301Id.  Griner also points out that not every purchase of group health insurance by an 
employer constitutes an employee benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA.  See id. (citing 
Fort Halifax Packaging Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987)).  The Fort Halifax ruling has 
been referred to as a “significant check on the sweep of the Pilot Life decision.”  See id. 
302Parver, supra note 119, at 228. 
303Id. 
304Id. (explaining that many times such cases stem from the denial of care pursuant to an 
HMOs utilization review in which a patient has lost the opportunity to undergo treatment 
when time was of the essence). 
305Id. at 207. 
306Id.  Congress has been called on to close the ERISA loophole:  
In other contexts throughout our legal system, foreseeable injuries caused by a failure 
to deliver what has been promised must be compensated. Under ERISA, however, 
working men and women give their labor in exchange for the promise of benefits, but 
are not compensated for injures when benefits are wrongly withheld. Under this 
system, an insurance company or HMO may stubbornly refuse to provide what is 
promised in the hope that the worker will not finance a court battle, and even if she 
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increasingly wary of letting third party payors go entirely ‘scott-free,’ and are 
devising new techniques to hold payors liable either through traditional agency 
principals or more direct routes.”307  
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court in the case of Herdrich v. Pegram should have adhered to the 
Appellate Court’s ruling and remanded the case back to the trial court for further 
review.  Two main arguments support a remand: (1) contrary to the Supreme Court 
ruling, a fiduciary duty exists between an HMO enrollee and the HMO under 
ERISA, and (2) physician financial incentive agreements play a direct role in 
physician decision making.  Both reasons are discussed in detail below. In addition, 
in realizing that financial incentives will continue to be a crucial part of managed 
care, solutions will be explored as to minimize harm to HMO members.  
A.  The Fiduciary Duty 
1.  The ERISA Standard 
In order for a member of an ERISA HMO to properly state a claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty, the member’s complaint must allege facts that set forth: (1) that the 
defendants are plan fiduciaries; (2) that the defendants breached their fiduciary 
duties; and (3) that a cognizable loss resulted.308  The Appellate Court held that 
Herdrich’s pleadings met each of the three requirements.309  The Supreme Court, 
however, held that mixed eligibility and treatment decisions made by an HMO were 
not fiduciary acts within the meaning of ERISA.310  
a.  A Fiduciary Under ERISA 
ERISA defines the term “fiduciary” as a person who (i) exercises discretionary 
authority or discretionary control respecting management of the plan or exercises any 
authority of control respecting management or disposition of its assets or . . . (iii) 
who has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the 
                                                          
does, years of litigation will produce no more than an order to provide the withheld 
benefits.  
Olena Berg, Ass’t Sec’y, Pension & Welfare Benefits Admin., ERISA Preemption:  Remedies 
for Denied or Delayed Health Claims, Senate Subcommittee on Labor, Health & Human 
Servs., Education & Related Agencies, 105th Cong. (1998).  See Parver, supra note 119, at 
n.38. 
307Id. at 207. 
308Herdrich at 369 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)). 
309Id. (holding “[w]e are of the opinion that Herdrich’s pleadings have more than 
sufficiently alleged each of these three elements”).  See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Appellate Court decision). 
310See Pegram at 235 (holding “[m]ixed eligibility decisions by HMO physicians are not 
fiduciary decisions under ERISA.  Herdrich’s ERISA count fails to state an ERISA claim, and 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.”).  See supra notes 99-111 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision). 
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administration of such plan.”311  When Congress enacted ERISA, it intended that this 
statutory definition of fiduciary be broadly interpreted.312  “A fiduciary need not be a 
person with direct access to the assets of the plan. . . . [c]onduct alone may . . . 
impose a fiduciary obligation.”313 
The Court itself describes the defining feature of an HMO as “receipt of a fixed 
fee for each patient enrolled under the terms of a contract to provide specified health 
care if needed.”314  This element of the HMO system causes Carle to fit neatly into 
the definition established by ERISA. Carle had, at a minimum, discretionary 
responsibility in the administration of the plan by operating a pre-paid health 
insurance plan that provides both medical and hospital services to its members.315  
Mr. Herdrich’s employer contracted with Carle in order to provide medical benefits 
to their employees, which would cause Carle to have discretionary responsibility 
over plan administration.316  
If Dr. Pegram was a “fee for service” provider, an argument may have been made 
that the sole administration of the care was managed by the physician due to the 
large amount of physician control in this type of system.317  However, in an HMO 
system like Carle’s, in which the care is managed by Carle through cost-controlling 
measures, Carle had at least discretionary responsibility over the administration of 
the plan.318   
In addition, it has been found that “conduct alone” may impose a fiduciary 
obligation.319  Any person with a specific duty imposed on them may be deemed to 
be a fiduciary.320  Carle provided pre-paid medical services to the employees of State 
Farm Insurance, Mr. Herdrich’s employer.321  Furthermore, Carle accepted the 
“duty” as Ms. Herdrich’s health care insurer by establishing a relationship with State 
                                                                
31129 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).  See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the fiduciary duty under 
ERISA).  
312See supra notes 261, 266. 
313Herdrich at 370 (“it is the clear intention of the Committee that any person with a 
specific duty imposed upon him by this statute be deemed to be a fiduciary.”). 
314Pegram at 218.  See supra note 129 and accompanying text (defining an HMO). 
315See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text (discussing Carle HMO). 
316See Pegram at 214.  See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (describing Carle’s 
relationship with State Farm Insurance, Mr. Herdrich’s employer). 
317See discussion supra Part III.A.1 (describing the “fee-for-service” physician payment 
system).  See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text (describing how “fee-for-service” 
allows the physician much control). 
318See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (describing Carle’s relationship with 
State Farm Insurance, Mr. Herdrich’s employer).  See also, Herdrich (“the defining feature of 
an HMO is receipt of a fixed fee for each patient enrolled under the terms of a contract to 
provide specified health care if needed.”). 
319Id. at 370. 
320See supra discussion Part III.B.2 (describing the fiduciary duty under ERISA). 
321See supra note 316. 
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Farm Insurance.322  Carle had the duty of administering Ms. Herdrich’s medical care, 
and decided where members could receive their care, urging the members to use 
Carle’s own physicians if at all possible.323  This conduct on the part of Carle 
establishes a fiduciary duty under the “broad” ERISA standard. 
b.  The Role of Utilization Review 
i.  Control of the Claims Process 
An important factor in determining fiduciary status is the retention of control of 
the claims process.324  The exclusive right to determine all disputed and non-routine 
claims is an important factor as well.325  The very nature of the cost-containment 
tactics used by HMOs controls the claims process.326 
The use of utilization review as a cost-containment tactic controls the claims 
process by deciding between those patient claims that are paid and those that are 
denied.  For example, pre-authorization programs will deny patient claims that are 
not pre-approved by the HMO.327  In prospective review, coverage can either be 
approved or denied even before the medical service has been performed.328  Every 
type of managed care organization uses utilization review programs.329  Carle’s 
utilization review system caused them to have retention over the claims process and 
thus a fiduciary status existed between Carle and the patient.  
ii.  Liability and Utilization Review 
In addition, case law shows that liability has been found solely based on the use 
of utilization review programs.330  A material question of liability is found in 
situations in which the organization’s conduct was a “substantial factor” in causing 
                                                                
322See supra note 276 and accompanying text (stating “[a] fiduciary within the meaning of 
ERISA must be someone acting in the capacity of a manager, administrator, or financial 
advisor to a plan.”). 
323See supra note 42 and accompanying text (describing Carle’s panel provider program), 
See discussion supra Part III.A.3.b (discussing HMO panel selection in general). 
324See Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 57 F.3d 608, 613 
(7th Cir. 1995) (holding employer was the plan fiduciary because they had retained the right to 
direct and control the claims procedures and practices, as well as the right to determine all 
disputed claims).  In addition, the fund was created and fully funded by the employer.  See Id.  
325Herdrich at 370. 
326See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing types of cost-containment strategies employed by 
HMOs). 
327See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM. PART B, supra note 5, at 92. 
328See supra discussion Part III.A.3.a (describing utilization review).  See supra notes 166-
69 and accompanying text (discussing prospective review). 
329See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM. PART A, supra note 116, at 68 (“UR [Utilization 
Review] programs are used by every type of managed care organization.”). 
330See Wickline v. California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1986), and, Wilson v. Blue Cross of 
Southern Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1990). 
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the complained circumstances.331  Although the “substantial factor” test has been 
used in the utilization review setting only, an argument can be made that the inability 
of Ms. Herdrich to receive a timely ultrasound was a “substantial factor” in the 
rupturing of her appendix.332  In fact, case law dealing directly with liability based on 
physician financial incentive programs has also utilized a causation approach.333   
The Bush334 case is an example of the judiciary’s willingness to review a 
causation approach in determining HMO liability.335  In Bush, the court found that 
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the HMO’s incentive scheme 
caused the late diagnosis of the plaintiff’s cervical cancer.336  The causation theory 
was not rejected based on the idea that the method in which the incentive scheme 
operated, may have contributed to the improper treatment of the patient.337 
In Herdrich, the Supreme Court denied the existence of a fiduciary duty under 
ERISA between Carle and Ms. Herdrich.338  However, the administrative ability that 
Carle retains, as exemplified through the use of utilization management procedures, 
causes them to retain control over the claims process, which is an important factor in 
determining fiduciary status under ERISA.339  The control of the claims process, 
compounded with the case law finding HMO liability based on the use of utilization 
review processes, points to the existence of a fiduciary duty even under the ERISA 
standards.  
c.  Mixed Eligibility Decisions and Fiduciary Duties 
The Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend Carle or any other HMO to 
be treated as a fiduciary to the extent that it makes mixed eligibility decisions acting 
through its physicians.340  “[P]ure eligibility decisions turn on the plan’s coverage of 
                                                                
331See Wilson at 883 (“[t]here is substantial evidence that Western Medical’s decision not 
to approve further hospitalization was a substantial factor in bringing about the decedent’s 
demise.”).  Id. 
332See supra note 24 and accompanying text (arguing that the delay in Ms. Herdrich’s 
ultrasound caused her appendix to rupture). 
333See discussion supra Part III.A.3.e (discussing the unpublished Michigan trial court 
opinion in Bush v. Dake).  Bush stated that “[d]ocumentary evidence has been presented which 
supports the plaintiff’s theory that the manner in which the system operated in this contributed 
to the improper treatment and delay in diagnosis of Mrs. Bush’s cancerous condition.”  Id. 
334ROSENBLATT, supra note 4. 
335See supra note 331. 
336See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text (discussing the courts decision in Bush). 
337See supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text (discussing the incentive scheme in the 
Bush case). 
338See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text (stating the Supreme Court’s review of 
the fiduciary duty in Herdrich). 
339See supra note 322 (explaining that the retention of control in the claims process has 
proven to be an indicator of the existence of a fiduciary duty). 
340Pegram at 230. 
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a particular condition or medical procedure.”341  In contrast, “treatment decisions are 
choices about how to go about diagnosing and treating a patient’s condition.”342  The 
Court held that these two decisions are inextricably mixed like countless medical 
administrative decisions made every day.343  Thus, the Court concluded that the 
decision made on Herdrich’s treatment course, while incorrect, was completely made 
by Pegram, not Carle.344 
When HMOs “direct” where and what procedures will be given through their 
utilization review programs, they do not consider themselves to be dictating to the 
physicians how to practice medicine.345  They view their actions as merely setting 
limits through the use of medical necessity determinations regarding the treatments 
for which the employers are willing or obligated to pay.346  In essence, the 
administrators argue that they are only making “business decisions.”347  Physicians, 
however, claim that these decisions made through utilization review systems do 
indeed equate to a medical decision made by the HMO.348   
Traditionally, physicians had a monopoly on the right to determine the 
appropriate course of medical treatment for their patients.349  As a result, physicians 
have bore the sole liability when a medical decision was found to be negligent.350  
“The advent of managed care and cost-containment mechanisms has altered 
decision-making authority.”351  Accordingly, a portion of the liability occurring from 
these decisions must also be shifted onto the managed care plans. The decision of 
medical treatment is no longer solely left up to the physician.  
Case law also reinforces the idea that utilization review decisions are indeed 
medical decisions. The seminal case in this area is Corcoran v. United 
HealthCare.352  The Fifth Circuit held that the utilization review decisions made by 
                                                                
341Id. at 228 (defining HMO eligibility decisions). 
342Id. (defining physician treatment decisions). 
343See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s analysis of 
“mixed eligibility” decisions in Herdrich). 
344Pegram at 228. 
345See Andresen, supra note 170, at 441. 
346Id. 
347Id. at 442 (stating that “these decisions involve coverage or reimbursement 
determinations that are in place to effectuate the cost-containment objectives at the core of 
managed care.”). 
348Id.  Some physicians argue that HMO administrators are exercising medical judgment 
without sufficient knowledge or ability to determine medical necessity and others argue that it 
interferes with the physician-patient relationship.  Id. Courts and administrative bodies are 
equally divided on the issue.  See Anderson, supra note 170, at 442. 
349Id. at 446.  See discussion supra Part III.A.1 (describing the “fee-for-service” physician 
payment system); See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text (describing how “fee-for-
service” allows the physician much control). 
350See Andresen, supra note 170, at 446. 
351Id. 
352Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992). 
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the HMO were, in fact, medical decisions.353  The court stated that “[b]y its very 
nature, a system of prospective decision making influences the beneficiary’s choice 
among treatment options to a far greater degree than does the theoretical risk of 
disallowance of a claim facing a beneficiary in a retrospective system.”354  
A decision was made that Ms. Herdrich would wait eight days in order to have 
her ultrasound procedure at a Carle facility.355  This treatment decision, although 
defined by the Court as mixed, was made by the HMO through their use of a 
“preferred provider” for ultrasound treatment located fifty miles away.356  Carle 
required that plan patients receive their medical care from Carle facilities.357  
Whatever the term that is placed on the decision, it was made by the HMO and 
liability should be shared with Dr. Pegram by the HMO.358 
In addition, the Supreme Court argues treatment decisions made by the HMO 
have only a “limited” resemblance to the usual business of traditional trustees in the 
classic fiduciary relationship.359  The Court readily admits that “physicians (like 
regular trustees) draw on resources held for others and make decisions to distribute 
them in accordance with entitlements expressed in a written instrument.”360  
However, the Court states that trustees do not make treatment decisions because 
these decisions are left to the discretion of the physicians.361  Herein lies the flaw in 
the Court’s argument.  In modern times, physicians do not make treatment decisions; 
they are made by the HMO.362  This switch in the decision-making power of 
physicians is evidenced by the use of utilization review and panel selection.363  
Utilization review controls the procedures ordered by the physician and panel 
selection controls the providers in which the physician may refer the patient.364  
These controls were not utilized in the former fee-for-service system but are 
mainstays in today’s health care environment.  This shift in the control of physician 
                                                                
353Id. at 1331. 
354Id. at 1332 (interestingly, while giving an indication that utilization review involves 
something more than an administrative question, the court did not allow the Corcorans to 
proceed at trial based on the fact that ERISA preempted any recovery). 
355See supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing the eight-day delay in receiving 
the ultrasound treatment). 
356See supra notes 27-29 (discussing Carle’s use of the hospital fifty miles away). 
357See supra notes 40-42 (discussing Carle’s use of “preferred providers” for their 
member’s care). 
358But see Wickline, at 1645 (“[t]he physician who complies without protest with the 
limitations imposed by a third-party payor, when his medical judgment dictates otherwise, 
cannot avoid his ultimate responsibility for his patient’s care.”). 
359Pegram at 231. 
360Id. 
361Id. at 232. 
362See discussion supra Part III.A.3 (discussing the different types of cost-containment 
programs used by HMOs). 
363Id. 
364See discussion supra Part III.A.3.a-b (discussing utilization review and panel selection). 
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decision-making has caused the physician to resemble the trustee in the classic trust 
relationship.365  Thus, in modern times trust relationship analogies may be utilized in 
describing the relationship between the HMO and the patient. 
The Court also argued it was “questionable” whether Congress had mixed 
eligibility decisions in mind when it provided that decisions in administering a plan 
were fiduciary in nature.366  The problem with the Court’s argument is that when 
ERISA was first passed in 1974, HMO and other third-party payment systems did 
not exist in the same manner as they do today.367  It would have been impossible for 
the drafters of ERISA to imagine that HMOs would eventually manage health care 
and decisions.  Despite changes in the health care system since ERISA’s birth, the 
congressional intent on which ERISA was based should still cover mixed eligibility 
decisions made in modern HMOs.368 
Congressional intent in drafting a statute is first reviewed when attempting to 
decipher when an action falls under the statute.369  By drawing an analogy to the 
pension situation in which ERISA was created, it can be concluded that it was the 
intent of Congress to protect patients and not to fully shelter HMO systems from 
liability.  ERISA was first established to protect retirees from the difficulties that 
they experienced in receiving their pension payments and the financial 
mismanagement that had often deprived the retirees of their benefits.370  Retirees 
were the persons the ERISA statute was created to protect. In the modern health care 
system, it is the HMO members that the statute should protect.  
Based on the plain definition utilized by ERISA in determining who is a 
fiduciary, Carle clearly is in a fiduciary relationship with Ms. Herdrich.  An 
important factor in determining fiduciary status is the retention of control over the 
claims process.  Through Carle’s use of modern HMO cost-containment techniques, 
like utilization review, Carle had control of the processing of its member’s medical 
claims.  Recent case law has shown that HMOs have been held liable on the 
decisions made through the use of utilization review procedures. In addition, 
utilization review decisions are medical decisions made by an HMO that should be 
considered fiduciary in nature.  Thus, all of these factors demonstrate that a fiduciary 
relationship between Carle and Ms. Herdrich existed. 
                                                                
365See supra notes 280-86 and accompanying text (describing the classic trust fiduciary 
relationship). 
366Pegram at 232 (“when Congress took up the subject of fiduciary responsibility under 
ERISA, it concentrated on a fiduciaries’ financial decisions, focusing on pension plans.”).  
367See Griner, supra note 12, at 920 (“[e]specially since any finding of third-party payor 
liability for negligence would not place any fiscal or administrative burden upon an employee 
benefit plan itself, there is no reason to extend ERISA preemption to this type of action.”). 
368See supra note 275 and accompanying text (explaining the congressional intent of 
ERISA). 
369Ingersoll-Rand Co. at 137-38.  See supra note 267 and accompanying text (describing 
the use of congressional intent). 
370Pegram at 232. 
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B.  Physician Financial Incentive Agreements Can Rise To A Breach 
Based on the fiduciary relationship between the HMO and its membership, a 
breach of this relationship occurs through the use of direct physician financial 
incentives.  Financial incentives have been found to rise to the level of a breach of 
fiduciary duty.371  The bonus distribution allocated to Carle’s physician/owners fits 
into the category of a physician financial incentive. 
1. Carle’s Bonus Distribution 
The claim in Herdrich brings to light Carle’s provision for a “year end 
distribution” to the plan’s physicians.372  Herdrich argued this particular incentive 
device of annually paying physician owners the profits resulting from their own 
decisions rationing care is a breach of the fiduciary relationship.373  This type of 
distribution could be defined as a bonus incentive.374  Bonus incentives are often 
used to control the use of ancillary services, for example an ultrasound exam.375  
Very often, ancillary services are paid out of a separate “pot” of funds and whatever 
funds are not used at the end of the year from procedures not performed is in turn 
returned to the physicians.376  Therefore, it could have been possible that Carle’s 
“year-end distribution” included funds not utilized on diagnostic procedures, like 
ultrasound exams.  If true, this bonus agreement could have given Dr. Pegram 
incentive not to promptly order the ultrasound exam for Ms. Herdrich.377 
In addition, ERISA expressly prohibits fiduciaries from dealing with the assets of 
the plan in its own interests or in its own account based on the idea that a fiduciary 
must perform his duties solely in the interest of the plan participants.378  A very 
strong argument can be made that Dr. Pegram had her own financial interests in 
                                                                
371Herdrich at 373 (“[i]ncentives can rise to the level of a breach where, as pleaded here, 
the fiduciary trust between plan participants and plan fiduciaries no longer exists (i.e. where 
physicians delay providing necessary treatment to, or withhold administering proper care to, 
plan beneficiaries for the sole purpose of increasing their bonuses)”).  See also, Shea v. 
Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding a breach of fiduciary duty for not 
disclosing physician financial incentive agreements).  But see, Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found. 
Health Plan of Texas, 198 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that ERISA does not impose 
a fiduciary duty on HMOs to disclose physician compensations and reimbursement schemes to 
plan members). 
372See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (discussing Carle’s “year-end 
distribution” to the plan’s physicians). 
373Id. 
374See discussion supra Part III.A.3.c.3 (describing physician bonus agreement and 
incentives used by HMOs to control costs). 
375See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text (explaining that ancillary services are 
very often a target for bonus withholds and distributions). 
376See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text (explaining how ancillary services are 
often paid out a separate set of finds). 
377See supra note 215 and accompanying text (stating that physicians recognize that they 
can increase the amount of their compensation if they reduce the use of ancillary services). 
378Herdrich at 371 (citing 29 U.S.C. §1104(a)(1)). 
330 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 16:289 
mind when she prevented Ms. Herdrich from having the ultrasound procedure at a 
nearby hospital instead of at the “plan’ hospital which was over fifty miles away. Dr. 
Pegram was likely aware that the fewer procedures enacted on clients, the larger her 
year end bonus would be.379 
Carle’s bonus agreement is not the only incentive at play here.  The tactic of 
panel selection is also involved.380  Panel selection involves the HMO choosing a 
select number of sites in which services may be conducted for their members.  The 
site where Herdrich had to wait eight days to receive treatment was a panel 
selection.381  The use of panel sites is often encouraged through the use of financial 
incentives placed on the physicians.  Their salary, bonuses, or continuance of an 
HMO physician may be completely or partially decided based on the use of these 
pre-selected sites.382 
2.  The Effect of Incentive Arrangements on Patient Care: Creating  
a System of Dual Loyalties 
Depending on the exact financial arrangement, the physician may have to choose 
between her own income and what is needed for the patient’s well-being.383  This 
choice creates a system of dual loyalties.  Financial incentives create a dual-loyalty 
that forces physicians to choose between the needs of their patients and physicians’ 
own financial well-being.  HMOs, like Carle, place physicians in this dilemma.  A 
strong argument can be made that current financial incentives placed on physicians 
like Dr. Pegram, advance this dilemma and encourage a decision based on financial 
factors. 
a. “ERISA Tolerates Some Conflict of Interest” 
It is true that ERISA allows fiduciaries to adopt dual loyalties.384  However, 
tolerance of dual loyalties does not extend to cases like Herdrich.385  The point is not 
                                                                
379See supra note 215 and accompanying text (stating that physicians recognize that they 
can increase the amount of their compensation if they reduce the use of ancillary services). 
380See discussion supra Part III.A.3.b (discussing the panel selection system and how it is 
a tool for cost-containment). 
381See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (explaining that the hospital where Dr. 
Pegram wanted Ms. Herdrich to have the ultrasound procedure conducted was a Carle 
facility). 
382See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text (discussing how the panel selection 
system creates a financial incentive to follow HMO policy in order to remain a part of the 
physician panel). 
383See Greely, supra note 180, at 71-72. 
384Herdrich at 373 (“[w]e do not disagree with this contention, for it is well established 
that dual loyalties are tolerated under ERISA.”). 
385Id. 
Our point is not that a fiduciary may not have dual loyalties; it is that the tolerance of 
dual loyalties does not extend to the situation like the case before us where a fiduciary 
jettisons his responsibility to the physical well-being of beneficiaries in favor of 
“loyalty” to his own financial interests). . . .  Tolerance, in other words, has its limits. 
Id. 
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that there may be dual loyalties; it is that they should not extend to a situation like 
this in which the fiduciary relinquishes his responsibility in order to improve his own 
financial standing.386  
A doctor that must provide for his own family would be interested in a relatively 
substantial bonus for himself.387  The complaint in Herdrich stated that the Carle 
doctors stood to benefit financially when they were able to limit the types of 
treatments and referrals.388  An argument can be made that Carle placed financial 
pressures on its physicians, like Dr. Pegram, through the use of financial incentives 
for offering less patient care.389  These dual loyalties arguably caused the Carle 
doctors to be faced with an incentive to limit care as to guarantee more of a bonus.390  
This financial pressure may have caused Dr. Pegram to make a decision based on her 
own financial well-being, possibly to the detriment of Ms. Herdrich. 
In addition, the Carle physicians were “intimately involved” with the financial 
well-being of the enterprise because the yearly bonus paid to them was controlled by 
their limited utilization of treatments and referrals to other physicians.391  This bonus 
arrangement has a direct link to the physician’s annual salary.  The situation in 
Herdrich is much different than the cases in which the ERISA’s acceptance of dual 
loyalties is founded. Case law on dual loyalties involves situations in which the dual 
loyalties did not have a direct link to the fiduciary’s annual salary.392  Thus, a 
distinction can be made between the fiduciary situation by which ERISA is accepting 
of dual loyalties and the Herdrich case.  The Herdrich case is a more extreme 
example of dual loyalties due to the direct link between the action that creates the 
dual loyalty and the direct effect the dual loyalty has on the fiduciary. In the end, this 
                                                                
386Herdrich at 373. 
387Id. at 379 (explaining that “[a] doctor who is responsible for the real life financial 
demands of providing for his or her family–sending four children to school (whether it be 
college, high school or primary school), making house payments, covering office overhead, 
and paying malpractice insurance, might very well ‘flinch’ at the prospect of obtaining a 
relatively substantial bonus for himself or herself.”). 
388See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (describing Herdrich’s allegations against 
Carle). 
389See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text (discussing how financial incentives are 
aimed at discouraging the ordering of an “extra” medical procedures). 
390See discussion supra Part III.A.3.c.3 (describing physician bonus agreement and 
incentives used by HMOs to control costs). 
391Herdrich at 379. 
392Id. (“the officers in Chalmers who made the decision to distribute severance benefits 
were not the owners of the corporation”).  In addition, the court added that “nothing in the 
facts of Chalmers leads us to infer that Quaker officers were shareholders, or even had an 
interest in the financial well-being of the company.”  Id.  (comparing the holding in Chalmers, 
61 F.3d at 1344, that an automatic bias did not exist against the distribution of severance 
benefits, despite the fact that the members of the committee that distributes the severance 
benefits were officers of the corporation).  The dissent in the Herdrich appellate decision 
argues that this case assists in establishing that ERISA does allow dual-loyalties of a fiduciary.  
Herdrich at 381 (“dual loyalties are not per se unlawful under ERISA”).  See also supra note 
84 and accompanying text (quoting Chalmers at ___). 
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dual loyalty makes it very difficult for a physician to choose to administer important, 
yet borderline necessary treatment, at the expense of their own financial well being. 
b.  A Lack of Accurate Data  
Much literature has been created over the past few decades seeking to find the 
differences in quality of care between the “fee-for-service” and HMO systems.393  
Overall, the literature seems to show that HMOs do not provide better, or worse 
care.394  However, it is very important to note that this conclusion is largely drawn 
from studies completed in the 1970s and 1980s, which were eras that included a 
different HMO system than today.395  Today’s managed care environment includes 
the immense use of cost-containment tactics.  “We cannot safely extrapolate from the 
response of physicians in the systems studied in those eras to the responses of 
physicians in today’s many different systems.”396  
Commentators have, however, identified a number of more detailed factors that 
are related to the degree of influence that direct financial incentives have on 
physician decision-making.397  The trial court should have reviewed three of these 
factors in order to better understand Dr. Pegram’s situation in making the treatment 
decisions that she made.  Those factors are: (1) the extent of the physician’s risk, (2) 
the number of physician’s sharing that risk, and (3) the portion of the physician’s 
income derived from the HMO.398 
The Court argued that if recovery were based on incentive programs 
implemented by HMOs alone, the HMO would be turned into a guarantor of 
recovery.399  Utilizing a factor test much like the one described above would not 
guarantee liability in every situation presented.  The test could be used in order to 
                                                                
393See Greely, supra note 180, at 71 (“a voluminous literature has built up over the past 
few decades seeking to find differences in the quality of care between fee-for-service and 
HMO systems.”). 
394Id. 
395See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text (describing the change in health care 
from the traditional “fee-for-service” system to modern managed care systems). 
396Greely, supra note 180, at 71.  See discussion supra Part III.A.3 (describing modern 
managed care cost-containment techniques).  See also discussion supra Part III.A.3.d 
(explaining data regarding the use of direct financial incentives by HMOs). 
397See Greely, supra note 180, at 72. 
398Id.  The complete list of factors is as follows: (1) the extent of the physician’s risk; (2) 
the existence and term of stop-loss insurance; (3) the distribution of risk to individual doctors 
or groups; (4) the number of physicians sharing the risk; (5) the number of patients in a 
physician’s patient panel; (6) the duration of the risk assessment period; (7) the generosity of 
the physician’s compensation for direct services; (8) the portion of the physician’s income 
derived from the HMO; and, (9) the generosity of service utilization budgets.  Id. (citing the 
GAO report found at, HEALTH, EDUC. & HUMAN SERV. DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, 
MEDICAID MANAGED CARE: MORE COMPETITION AND OVERSIGHT WOULD IMPROVE 
CALIFORNIA’S EXPANSION PLAN (1995). 
399Pegram at 234-35 (“[I]t would be so easy to allege, and to find, an economic influence 
when sparing care did not lead to a well patient, that any such standard in practice would allow 
a factfinder to convert an HMO into a guarantor of recovery.”). 
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conduct a fair analysis of the physician’s relation to the HMO’s financial incentives.  
Perhaps a review of the factors introduced would determine that Dr. Pegram did 
make her decision to prolong the ultrasound analysis based on strict medical-
judgment.  The problem is that the Herdrich record is void of any analysis of this 
sort.  The Court erred in not allowing the case to be remanded to the trial court in 
order to investigate the payment scheme utilized by Carle on Dr. Pegram.  Only 
broad generalizations were made by the Court in citing a “flood gate” theory in not 
allowing the case to be reviewed again by the trial court.400 
c. The Physician Response and Patient Trust 
Additional evidence can be found by looking at how physicians feel about HMO 
cost-control arrangements.  Many physicians, with financial incentives placed on 
them by health plans, believe undivided loyalty to their patients has diminished in 
the profession during the past ten years.401  Commentators argue that the economic 
exigencies of the time require adjustment of the moral standard of undivided 
loyalty.402  It has been demonstrated that physicians with financial incentives based 
on productivity are less satisfied with their practices and are more “ethically 
troubled” than their colleagues who are not in the same environment.403  “Physicians 
imbued with a sense of professional identity that has stressed altruism and loyalty to 
patients may experience the appeal to financial self-interests as a means of 
controlling costs, as a direct threat to their self-understanding as professionals.”404  It 
is not difficult to discern from the above data that Dr. Pegram may have been 
experiencing many of the expressed feelings in deciding a treatment course for Ms. 
Herdrich.  What role the financial incentives played with Dr. Pegram is still 
unknown. 
Trust is at the center of the physician-patient relationship.405  Patient reports 
regarding their trust in their physician are tightly correlated with the perceptions of 
physicians.406  The “dual agency” inherent in these financial arrangements may feed 
                                                                
400Id. at 237 (“[W]hat would be gained by opening the federal courthouse doors for a 
fiduciary malpractice claim, save for possibly random fortuities such as more favorable 
scheduling, or the ancillary opportunity to seek attorney’s fees.”). 
401See Sulmasy, supra note 6, at 7 (explaining that “in a multivariate regression analysis, 
physicians who reported financial incentives to limit tests, treatments, and referrals were 
significantly and independently more likely to find such financial incentives morally troubling, 
to believe that commitment to the ethic of undivided loyalty to patients has eroded, and to 
report diminished patient trust in them.”).  See also supra note 11 (discussing the parameters 
in which the survey and analysis was conducted). 
402See Sulmasy, supra note 6, at 2. 
403Id. at 7. 
404Id. 
405Id. at 9.  See also E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical 
Care, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1719, 1727 (1987) (“The patient must be able to repose confidence in 
his physician, believing that the latter will be not only professionally competent but also 
devoted to his interests.”). 
406See Sulmasy, supra note 6, at 9. 
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patient skeptics about their physician’s loyalty to them.407 A trusting relationship is 
essential to good health care.408  “To permit physicians routinely to balance their 
patients’ interests against others economic welfare could devastate this fiduciary 
relationship.”409  The patient must believe that the physician will not only be 
professionally competent but also devoted to his interests.410 
d.  The Role of the Market Forces Argument 
The dissent in the Seventh Circuit opinion argued that “market forces” help 
reduce the risk that a fiduciary’s conflict of interest will work to the detriment of the 
plan and the plan beneficiaries.411  The dissent states, without any citation, that “plan 
sponsors are likely to take their business elsewhere if they perceive that incentives 
are working to the detriment of beneficiaries or to the plan itself, and thus market 
forces go a long way towards ensuring that incentives do not rise to a dangerous or 
undesirable levels.”412  
Herdrich is a clear example of why the market forces argument does not protect 
HMO members against financial incentives raising to dangerous levels.  “The 
‘market forces’ the dissent refers to hardly seem to have produced a positive result in 
this case. . . .”413  Due to the financial incentives placed on Dr. Pegram, which 
resulted in a delay in diagnosis, Ms. Herdrich suffered a life threatening illness.414  
This illness necessitated a longer hospital stay and a more serious surgery, which 
came at a greater cost to both Ms. Herdrich and Carle.415  
In addition, the dissent also raises an “efficiency argument” that financial 
incentives may bring about a more effective use of HMO assets.416  The flaw in this 
argument is clearly articulated by the Seventh Circuit: “Indeed, the eight-day delay 
                                                                
407Id. (explaining that while their data can not establish a clear cause-and-effect 
relationship between financial incentives and diminished patient trust, the date does add fuel to 
the argument that there is a connection). 
408See Morreim, supra note 402, at 1727 (explaining that unless patients believe that their 
physician is acting in their own best interests, it would be difficult for a patient to have a 
trusting relationship that is essential in the delivery of good health care). 
409Id. 
410Id. 
411See Herdrich at 381.  See discussion supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the dissent in the 
Seventh Circuit decision).  See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text (describing the 
“market forces” argument in greater detail). 
412Herdrich at 374. 
413Id. 
414See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text (describing the delay of the ultrasound 
procedure as the cause of Ms. Herdrich’s peritonitis). 
415Herdrich at 374 (explaining that “[i]n an effort to defray the increased costs associated 
with the surgery required to drain and cleanse Herdrich’s ruptured appendix, Carle insisted 
that she have the procedure performed at its own Urbana facility, necessitating that Herdrich 
travel more than fifty miles from her neighborhood hospital in Bloomington, Illinois.”). 
416See supra note 86, and accompanying text (describing the dissent’s “efficiency 
argument.”). 
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in medical care, and the onset of peritonitis Herdrich incurred as a result of such 
delay in diagnosis, subjected her to a life-threatening illness, a longer period of 
hospitalization and treatment, more extensive, invasive, and dangerous surgery, 
increased hospital costs, and a greater ingestion of prescription drugs.”417  This is not 
a good example of the efficient use of medical resources.  Overall, “[m]arket forces 
are insufficient to cure the deleterious affects of managed care on the health care 
industry.”418 
The determination that Carle breached their fiduciary duty to Ms. Herdrich is 
premised on two facts.  First, ERISA expressly prohibits fiduciaries from dealing in 
the assets of the plan.  A strong argument can be made that the bonus agreement that 
Carle placed on Dr. Pegram caused her to order fewer procedures for her patients 
knowing that this action would increase her individual bonus at the end of the year.  
The bonus was directly tied to ordering less care.  
Secondly, it can be argued that ERISA would not tolerate a dual loyalties 
situation in the HMO setting.  The cases in which the acceptance of dual loyalties in 
the fiduciary setting are not analogous to the Herdrich case.  The main defining 
factor being a direct link between the fiduciaries’ annual salary and the medical 
decisions being made for the fiduciary.  
In addition, data suggests that patient trust in their physicians is decreasing.  This 
factor, along with the first two aforementioned clearly establish a breach in the 
fiduciary relationship between Carle and Ms. Herdrich.  
C.  Solutions  
Whether we like it or not, physician financial incentives are a crucial part of our 
modern health care economy and are here to stay.  In order to prevent situations like 
Ms. Herdrich’s from occurring, while still continuing to keep health care costs at a 
manageable level, a delicate balance must be met.  Three main things must occur in 
order for this balance to be met: (1) cases like Herdrich v. Pegram must be remanded 
for continued fact-finding regarding the details of the financial motives involved, (2) 
ERISA must be amended in order to acknowledge a fiduciary relationship between 
HMO members and the HMO itself, and (3) physician financial arrangements must 
be disclosed to HMO patient members. 
1.  Remand Herdrich v. Pegram 
Although the amount of hard data available regarding the true impact of 
physician incentive programs and patient care is sparse, the courts should scrutinize 
the facts of each incentive case in order to collect information regarding the true 
impact of these programs.419  Broad statements can easily be made about the different 
types of financial incentive agreements utilized by HMOs.  However, incentive 
agreements vary greatly from HMO-to-HMO based on several factors, including the 
                                                                
417Herdrich at 378. 
418Id. at 374-75. 
419See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.b (discussing the lack of accurate data regarding the 
effect financial incentives have on physician care).  See supra notes 224-31 and accompanying 
text (discussing the extent of the use of financial incentives by HMOs). 
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type of HMO and physician reimbursement arrangements.420  Factors have been 
created that set up a framework for reviewing the individual physician’s 
arrangement.421  Courts should be encouraged to use this list and to eventually create 
their own.  Case law is sparse in this area and needs to be established.422   
There are many facts that will continue to remain unknown about Dr. Pegram’s 
motives in delaying the ultrasound procedure.  We will never know the details on 
Carle’s “year-end” distribution to know if it did play a factor in the delay of the 
ultrasound.  In addition, it will remain unknown the role that the reimbursement 
system utilized by Carle played in Dr. Pegram’s decision-making.  Possibly, Dr. 
Pegram felt pressure to refer patients only to Carle providers for fear that she would 
be de-selected from Carle’s physician panel.423  The Court should have remanded the 
Herdrich case for these reasons.  This case presented the Court with an opportunity 
to create much needed case law dealing with the impact of these incentive programs 
and it failed to take advantage of that opportunity. 
The Court fears that a decision finding a breach of fiduciary relation based on 
incentive arrangements would cause a type of “instant liability” for HMOs.424  This is 
simply not true.  By establishing factors to review each physician incentive 
arrangement involved, a case-by-case analysis could be conducted that will not result 
in per se liability for the HMO.  The longer that the issue of physician incentive 
agreements is accepted by the court, the more complex and confusing the situation 
will become.  Moreover, HMOs will continue to escape liability.425  It is time that the 
Court stops hiding behind definitional roadblocks and creates some much needed 
precedent. 
2.  Amending ERISA 
The Herdrich decision, and many others before it, was burdened with the hurdles 
of ERISA.  It was not the intent of the drafters of ERISA to put roadblocks between 
                                                                
420See discussion supra Part III.A.2.a-c (discussing the types of HMO’s and they methods 
in which they are organized).  See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text (explaining the 
different levels of liability associated with each HMO type). 
421See supra note 395 and accompanying text (describing the factor test established by the 
GAO for determining the strength that the individual’s financial incentives have on their 
patient care decision making). 
422See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text (indicating that there are currently very 
few published opinions regarding the use of physician financial incentive programs by 
HMOs). 
423See discussion supra Part III.A.3. b (discussing panel selection).  See supra notes 377-
79 and accompanying text (discussing how Dr. Pegram may have feared being de-selected 
from Carle’s physician panel). 
424See supra notes 396-97 and accompanying text (arguing that if a factor type analysis 
was utilized by the courts, HMOs would not become instant “guarantors of recovery” based 
solely on its use of financial incentive programs). 
425See supra notes 298-305 and accompanying text (describing the “roadblocks” that 
ERISA places in front of a patient attempting to bring a claim against their HMO). 
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patients and the care that they need.426  A quick look at the early stages of ERISA 
reveals this fact.  ERISA was created to make sure that persons had access to the care 
they needed.427  Too many courts have used ERISA as a method of avoiding review 
and eventual decisions of these issues.  ERISA has simply turned into a tool used by 
health care organizations to avoid liability.  This could not have been what the 
drafters intended.428  
There are two ways ERISA could be amended: (1) ERISA should be amended to 
acknowledge a fiduciary relationship between the HMO and HMO patient; and (2) 
ERISA should be amended to expand the “insurance savings clause” to include 
common-law tort and contract claims. 
a.  Acknowledgement of a Fiduciary Relationship 
Herdrich is a fine example of a clear fiduciary relationship that is established 
between an HMO and a member through the utilization programs that are utilized by 
health care plans.429  Utilization review methods are an accepted method of modern 
HMO practice and they should be accepted as creating a fiduciary relationship.430  
The argument could continue forever on who really makes the decisions:  The 
physician or the HMO.431  However, while we are busy arguing this fact, patients are 
left without a remedy through ERISA against their HMO for mistakes made in the 
utilization review process. 
In the beginning, one of the primary goals of ERISA was to create uniformity in 
regulation of these types of plans.432  By amending ERISA’s preemption provision to 
acknowledge a fiduciary relationship between the HMO and the member, uniformity 
can be achieved in hearing these claims.  Claims will finally be argued by looking at 
the exact incentive schemes of the physician involved.  
By declaring that a fiduciary duty exists under ERISA between the HMO and the 
patient, we are guaranteeing that HMO members will have a cause of action in order 
to enforce their rights to full and complete medical treatment no matter what the 
cost- containment tactic utilized by the managed care plan is.  
                                                                
426See supra note 367 and accompanying text (explaining what types of people the ERISA 
statute was designed to protect). 
427Id. (explaining that ERISA was first established to protect retirees from mismanagement 
by employers of their retirement benefits which is analogous to protection of the health 
benefits of the modern day HMO member). 
428See supra notes 267-70 and accompanying text (explaining the congressional intent 
behind the ERISA statute). 
429See discussion supra Part IV.A.1 (arguing that a fiduciary duty does exist between 
Carle and Ms. Herdrich partly through Carle’s usage of physician incentive programs like 
utilization review). 
430See supra note 327 and accompanying text (stating that utilization review is used by 
almost every HMO in some form or another). 
431See discussion supra Part IV.1.c (discussion the “mixed eligibility decision” debate). 
432See supra note 256 and accompanying text (stating the purpose of the ERISA statute to 
create a comprehensive, uniform regulatory system for self-funded employee benefit plans). 
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b.  Expansion of the “Savings Clause” 
According to current case law, common-law tort and contract claims do not fall 
under the “savings clause” and are preempted by ERISA.433  Therefore, patients who 
are part of an ERISA qualified plan are blocked from bringing tort and contract 
claims.434 The ERISA preemption creates a major roadblock to patient recovery in 
these types of situations.435  The patient’s only option is to attempt to prove a breach 
by utilizing the ERISA standards, which did not work very well for Ms. Herdrich. 
By expanding the “savings clause” to include these common law claims, an 
additional avenue would be available for patient recovery when harm has been done.  
By amending the “savings clause,” those patients, who are a part of an ERISA 
qualified plan and those who are not, would be placed on a level playing field.  The 
protection of patient interests is far from adequate under the current ERISA statute 
and legislative action should be taken to correct this situation. 
3.  Full Disclosure of Incentive Agreements 
HMOs should be required to disclose the financial incentives under which their 
physicians work. Courts have already endorsed disclosure.436  “From the patients’ 
point of view, a financial incentive scheme put into place to influence a treating 
doctor’s referral practices when the patient needs specialized care is certainly a 
material piece of information.”437  Patients may make different decisions for their 
course of treatment if they are aware of the incentive schemes in which their 
physicians are involved.438 
Information that is presented regarding incentive agreements at the time a 
member enrolls can help the patient plan their coverage more effectively, including 
choice of health plan and choice of coverage.439  This information should come from 
the HMO as a part of an integrated communications strategy along with a core 
obligation of the health plan to provide members with simple descriptions of 
financial incentives, written in plain language, and distributed in connection with 
information on physician selection and denial.440  If all this information is distributed 
together, members will be able to make informed health care choices and they will 
                                                                
433See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text (citing the holding in Pilot Life that 
common law claims for tort and contract do not fall under the “savings clause” of ERISA).  
See discussion supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the “savings clause” of ERISA). 
434Id. 
435See supra notes 298-99 and accompanying text (describing the “roadblock” that ERISA 
pre-emption causes for patients who attempt bring liability claims against their HMO). 
436See supra note 368 and accompanying text (describing the Shea case in which the court 
found a breach of fiduciary duty for not disclosing physician financial incentive agreements).  
437See Shea at 628. 
438Id. at 627 (explaining that according to Mr. Shea’s widow, if her husband would have 
known about his doctor’s incentive agreement, he would have disregarded the doctor's advice 
and sought a second opinion at his own expense). 
439See Miller, supra note 7, at 5. 
440Id. at 9. 
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be empowered to exercise their rights as a member of the HMO once they are 
enrolled.441 
“Disclosure therefore dovetails with a national trend toward creating new legal 
rights for managed care members, including the right to change primary care 
physicians, to examine utilization review criteria, and to appeal coverage decisions to 
an entity independent of the health plan.”442  In order to benefit from these 
entitlements, members must understand the basis of managed care and it is the 
HMO’s responsibility to make sure that they receive the information.443  Legal 
mandates for health plan disclosure are already on the rise.  Since 1995, nearly 
twenty states have required insurance companies and HMOs to explain physician 
compensation methods to enrollees.444  
V. CONCLUSION 
In the past, the incentive for physicians was to provide more care, not less.445  In 
the modern, managed care environment, the incentive has been reversed.446  HMOs 
were created in order to apply much-needed cost-containment programs to the health 
insurance industry.447  HMOs and their utilization review systems have succeeded in 
controlling health care costs.448  However, liability must be accepted by HMOs for 
use of their cost-containment methods like physician financial incentive programs.  
These programs establish a fiduciary duty between the HMO and patient that should 
no longer be ignored.449 
Future cases similar to Herdrich v. Pegram will provide the opportunity for the 
legal system to take a stand on HMO liability.  In this case, the Court missed the 
opportunity.  Financial incentive programs placed on physicians cause them to be 
                                                                
441Id. at 7. 
442Id. 
443Id. at 5, 7 (arguing that incentive programs should be discussed with the patient by the 
HMO and not the physician due to the possible negative impact the information may have on 
the patient’s view of the physician and the medical profession as a whole).  However, trust of 
physicians involved in an HMO may already be diminished and candor to the patient 
regarding the existence of incentive programs may reinforce trust for some patients.  And See, 
Miller, supra note 7, at 57. 
444Id. at 6 (explaining that “the health plan is permitted to include, in a separate section, an 
explanation or justification for these incentives or penalties.”). 
445See supra note 116 and accompanying text (explaining the physician’s desire to provide 
more patient care, not less). 
446See supra note 136 and accompanying text (explaining how the modern HMO system 
encourages a physician to provide less care, not more). 
447See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text (explaining why health care costs have 
skyrocketed, thus causing the need for HMOs). 
448See discussion supra Part III.A.3.a (discussing utilization review as a cost-containment 
program). 
449See discussion supra Part IV.A.1 (arguing that a fiduciary duty does exist between 
Carle and Ms. Herdrich partly through Carle’s usage of physician incentive programs like 
utilization review). 
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“tempted” to choose between their own financial well-being and the best course of 
treatment for their patients.450  Movement should be made towards striking a balance 
between all the systems at play causing tension between the patient, physician, and 
HMO.  This balance can be made through disclosure of physician incentive programs 
and the amendment of ERISA.451  HMOs serve both an important and effective role 
in controlling skyrocketing health care costs, but along with this role comes the need 
to take responsibility for their decisions.  
                                                                
450See supra note 380 (explaining the dual-loyalties situation). 
451See discussion supra Part IV.C.3 (arguing mandatory disclosure to HMO members by 
the HMO of any financial incentive agreements that they may have with their physicians). 
